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ABSTRACT
 
Community college students (n =353) participated in a
 
study investigating qualitative and quantitative differences
 
in worry as a shared cognitive component of test anxiety
 
and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Moreover, cognitive
 
coping with stress was examined as a potential moderator of
 
GAD-like worry. Participants ranked in the upper 20^''
 
percentile on a measurement of test anxiety rated
 
significantly higher than the bottom 80^'^ percentile on a
 
measure of trait anxiety. Utilizing Eysenck's
 
Hypervigilance and Processing Efficiency theories (1992) and
 
Epstein's construct of Constructive Thinking (1991), it was
 
hypothesized that high test anxious participants could be
 
categorized as either GAD-like or high test / trait anxious
 
(HT/TA) worriers on the basis of DSM-IV GAD diagnostic
 
criteria. It was hypothesized that means tests comparing
 
the GAD and HT/TA worrier groups would reveal that GAD
 
worriers; would rate significantly higher on measures of
 
number and breadth of worries, would rate significantly
 
lower on a measure of cognitive coping with stress, and
 
would rate significantly higher on measures of social
 
evaluative concerns. All hypotheses were confirmed.
 
Results are interpreted as suggesting that within a
 
diathesis stress model cognitive coping with stress may
 
moderate GAD vulnerability. Future research directions are
 
discussed.
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TEST ANXIETY AND COPING WITH EVALUATION
 
Viewed as a response to stress, anxiety represents a
 
possible reaction to threat detection, threat appraisal, and
 
apprehension regarding potential outcome (Wells, 1994b).
 
Research investigating anxiety and anxiety disorders
 
suggests three measurable factors are central to the
 
expression of anxiety. These are referred to as
 
physiological, cognitive, and behavioral factors. These
 
factors are considered as broadly representing observable
 
responses to an anxiety producing stressor (Barlow, 1988;
 
Lang, 1971). Thus, a person's anxious response to a
 
stressful situation that signals threat may be an increase
 
in heart rate (physiological), an unwanted preoccupation
 
with diffuse and worrisome thoughts concerning potential
 
outcomes and/or future similar anxiety producing situations
 
(cognitive), and the subsequent avoidance of like situations
 
based upon the person's expectancies and apprehensions of
 
the experienced anxiety reoccurring (behavioral). These
 
factors are typical of anxious responding to stress observed
 
in clinical and non-clinical populations (Beck & Emery,
 
1985).
 
Daily activities can produce unwanted stress without
 
producing anxiety. In this regard, an individual's ability
 
to adequately cope with life events is related to whether
 
stress results in anxiety. It has been shown that coping
 
with stress contributes to psychological well-being and
 
overall health (Selye, 1976). Thus, it is a reasonable
 
assumption that successful coping serves to moderate the
 
course of stressed responding in such a way that anxiety may
 
also be moderated (Dombeck, Siegle, & Ingram, 1996; Lazarus,
 
1993; Smith, 1996). For instance, a student facing an exam
 
may feel stressed over it. However, stress may elicit that
 
a competent plan as a form of coping with any perceived
 
problems in performance. Studying differences in the
 
relationship between peopleVs perception of stressful social
 
situations and attendant anxiety may provide evidence
 
regarding how the cognitive, behavioral, and physiological
 
factors of their anxiety are influenced by coping's
 
moderating effects.
 
Theorists have emphasized the relationship between
 
certain affective disorders, such as social phobia and
 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD), and negatively biased
 
social perceptions (Borkovec, 1994; Eysenck, 1992).
 
Specifically, an individual's unrealistic concerns over
 
behavioral competency and adequate social responding during
 
social interaction may induce and sustain a stress-related
 
anxiety component of the disorder (Carver & Scheier, 1988).
 
These biased perceptions are correlated with a fear of
 
negative evaluation by others, fear of failure, and
 
excessive and uncontrollable worry (Barlow & DiNardo, 1991;
 
Borkovec & inz, 1990; Eysenck, 1992).
 
Research based on such theories suggests that some
 
people may automatically process ambiguous social stimuli as
 
threatening, interfering with otherwise effective coping by
 
inducing a state of stress tbat elicits anxiety (Borkovec,
 
Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991). Individual differences in biased
 
endogenous threat processing (i.e., dispositional/trait
 
anxiety) can negatively impact responding in stressful
 
social situations when a current and otherwise normal
 
activity is perceived as being susceptible to threatening
 
social evaluation (Campbell & Fehr, 1990). Anxiety may then
 
lead to disruption of task-^fpcus and an evolving perception
 
that a climate of negative evaluation exists. For people
 
who are predisposed to process in this manner, such
 
perceptions may elicit chronic compensatory patterns of
 
anxious behavior, thought, and physiologic responding (Olah,
 
Torestad, & Magnusson, 1989; Ormel & Wholfarth, 1991).
 
Thus, Under stressful circumstances a coping individual
 
may be incapable of maintaining adequate levels of task-

focus and performance. Reduced task performance would
 
facilitate worry and anxiety that in-'turn would facilitate
 
the degradation of ongoing respohding across social
 
situations in-general. The evolution of an individual's
 
transient, stress-induced biased processing of threat
 
stimuli towards Ghronic and maiadaptive anxious-response
 
themes of social behavior is a component of theoretical
 
models for vulnerability to, and genesis of, clinical
 
anxiety disorder (C.F., Beck & Emery, 1985; Eysenck, 1991c;
 
Gray, 1985; MacLeod, 1996).
 
The stressful initiatipn of perseverating, excessive
 
worry may follow inappropriate resppriding elicited by the
 
perceived climate of evaluative threat. The incessant
 
rumination of negative thoughts then leads to greater worry
 
and more inappropriate responding resulting in a vicious
 
cycle exacerbating anxiety and ineffective coping* Under
 
these circumstances worry is the principle response-factor
 
characterizing the experience of anxiety. When worrying
 
persists over an ensuing time period of six months, a major
 
constituent of a clinical GAD diagnosis possibly exists
 
(Batlow et al., 1986). Thus, research studying worry as
 
represehting the increased vulnerability to anxiety is a
 
necessary pursuit, considering anxiety's debilitating
 
effects.
 
Limited-Capacity Threat Processing
 
As a survival adaptation, threat's rapid detection
 
ihcreases the likelihood of successfully avoiding harm. in
 
their comprehensive review of experimental evidence
 
concerning the role of attention and anxiety, Williams,
 
Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews (1988) suggest that the
 
detection of threat engages both nonconscious (preattentive)
 
and conscious (focused attention) aspects of cognitive
 
processing. As a stimulus is detected, scrutinized, and
 
subsequently perceived to be threatening, an increase in
 
arousal occurs. Under these conditions, arousal is
 
accompanied by the increased aliocation of cognitive
 
resources allotted to the threat processing of that stimulus
 
(C.F., Barlow, 1988; Martin, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; Shapiro
 
& Lim, 1989).
 
Initial stressful stimulus detection may solicit threat
 
processing without resulting in worry, situational
 
avoidance, or physiological distress. Following threat's
 
detection, but prior to any appropriate responding that may
 
occur, the context in which the threat-'stimulus is embedded
 
needs to be evaluated (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Gontext­
deperident threat processing includes possible stress
 
reactions, relevant perceptions, and the allocation of
 
automatic and controlled attentional resources. Such
 
processing may be considered adaptive to the extent the
 
situation is appropriately appraised as a pre-condition to
 
threat or non-threat respohding. Therefore, threat
 
processing can be considered a necessary but not a
 
sufficient condition for anxiety.
 
Thus, the continuation of ongoing behavior disregarding
 
as threatening an indeterminable, ambiguous social stimuli
 
may represent appropriate responding to initial threat
 
detection without attendant anxiety. For example, a
 
student's perception of missing lecture notes Goncurrent
 
with stressful anticipation of an upcoming exam may not
 
elicit uncontrbllable worry cDncerning their test-taking
 
ability. In contrast, unable to determine the weighted
 
importance of the missing information, the student can focus
 
on existing lecture notes, homevrork, and course readings.
 
For this student, the processing of ambiguous stimuli
 
moderates the experience of anxiety and the perception that
 
exams are a threatening stimuli representing negative
 
performance evaluation by Others.
 
Processing Efficiency Theory (PET; Eysenck & Calvo,
 
1992) maintains that some individuals are dispositionally
 
oriented towards worry as a response to situational stress
 
that induces anxiety (state-anxiety). Wdrry requires
 
cognitive resources that would otherwise be used for the
 
efficient processing of, and efficient responding to,
 
important environmental information. PET assumes that
 
stressful situations require corresponding increases in
 
cognitive effort over and above that which is currently
 
being utilized. PET postulates that for those people whose
 
response to stressful situations is worry, the additional
 
effort compensating for worry's effects only serves to
 
maintain current levels of performance. The same effort
 
provides a performance benefit in the case of the non-

worrier. For example, a worried student may have to
 
concentrate and re-read an important assigned article to
 
overcome distracting unwanted thoughts and maintain their
 
reading-comprehension level. On the other hand, the same
 
level of Concentrated re-reading by a non-worried student
 
would result in a greater depth of comprehension. It is
 
assumed that this observed difference occurs due to worry
 
being maintained by focused attention and lexical rehearsal
 
in working memory and worry's preemptive utilization of
 
cognitive resources that would otherwise facilitate the task
 
at-hand.
 
PET utilizes a model of working memory that posits
 
three subsystems (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley St Hitch, 1974).
 
These subsystems are the executive, the articulatory loop,
 
and the visio-spatial sketchpad. The executive (i.e.,
 
central executive) is primarily involved with the
 
integration of incoming sensory information With information
 
in long-term memory and the coordinating of focused
 
attention mediating stimulus response. The executive is
 
also the analog of attention in awareness or consciousness.
 
The articulatory loop (i.e., phonological loop) serves to
 
process lexical comprehension. Another function of this
 
subsystem is to maintain auditory and lexical information in
 
memory through rehearsal long enough to be considered by the
 
executive for storage in long term memory. The visio­
spatial sketchpad represents a visual imagery memory
 
capacity of limited duration. This aspect of working memory
 
is assumed to facilitate mental imagery by maintaining an
 
analog of visual stimuli during that stimuli's cognitive
 
processing (e.g., looking at a wall-map while attempting to
 
visualize and memorize relevant landmarks).
 
There is evidence supporting PET in recent research on
 
the effects of worry on working memory. For instance, in an
 
experiment requiring the transformation of letters in
 
forward numeric-dependent alphabetic sequence (i.e., MH + 2
 
= OJ) by high and low anxious individuals, the high anxious
 
group had significantly greater response times when compared
 
to the low anxious group; anxiety affected the performance
 
of letter transformation associated with increased
 
processing in the worry-related areas of working memory
 
(Eysenck, 1985).
 
Worriers simultaneously utilized existing cognitive
 
resources and maintained worry. Cognitive effort did solve
 
the letter transformation task, but not by the efficient use
 
of resources in working memory where response-speed is
 
considered an index of processing efficiency. The low
 
anxious group took comparatively less time to complete the
 
cognitive task. For them, increased effort contributed to
 
an increase in efficient problem solving. High anxious
 
individuals were unable to redirect working memory towards
 
problem solving presumably due to its maintenance of anxious
 
worry. This inability was evidence of limitations imposed
 
by this group's restricted capacity of resources.
 
These results suggest that attentional resources,
 
otherwise available to the executive for directing focused
 
attention toward the arena of working memory, were engaged
 
by the articulatory loop and its lexical processing function
 
of thought irehearsal presumed to maintain worry. In a
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review of these experiments, Eysenck (1992) concluded that "
 
... worry induction produces a shift towards predominance of
 
... the workings of the articulatory loop ... it would
 
clearly be useful to have additional information concerning
 
the processing mechanisms involved in worry" (p.145).
 
Situational stress and the advent of anxiety are
 
correlated with perceptual activity, arousal, and levels of
 
adeguate responding in a performance task (Shapiro, Egerman,
 
& Klein; 1984). There is experimental evidence supporting
 
the assertion that people possess finite cognitive resources
 
limiting the ability to effectively process information when
 
conditions are sufficiently stressful (Beck & Emery, 1985;
 
Darke, 1988; Eysenck, 1985). The thrust of research in this
 
area is invested in undei^standing how anxiety loads
 
additional non-conscious processing demands upon working
 
memory until effective cognitive appraisal of threat-related
 
stimuli and adequate response becomes problematic, if not
 
maladaptive.
 
Easterbrobk (1959) postulated a relationship between
 
anxiety, arousal, and attention during task performance.
 
Arousal significantly attenuates the focus of attention on a
 
task, thereby narrowing its scope (i.e., cognitive breadth
 
of attention in awareness). Thus, in Easberbrook's view a
 
narrowing of attention that may initially benefit
 
performance occurs in response to anxiety by limiting the
 
quaintity of irrelevant information attended to. However, a
 
continued increase in arousal may lead to the continued
 
narrowing of attentional focus. Subseguently, task-relevant
 
information previously located within the scope of attention
 
is peripheralized and not detected. A narrowing of
 
attentional focus past the point of effectiveness results
 
from an arousal factor and arousal's effect on attention.
 
Easterbrook's hypothesis posits a relatively direct
 
correspondence between an increase in arousal and the
 
narrowing of visual attention. The arousal-attention
 
process is predicated upon concurrent threat detection and
 
cognitive appraisal where arousal directs the function of
 
attention. The convergence of attention on a detected
 
threat source following anxious arousal limits the
 
availability of necessary information—over-focusing
 
precipitates a decrement in response performance."
 
There is qualified experimental support for
 
Easterbrook's hypothesis from studies that suggest
 
experimental peripheral detection tasks performed during
 
stress-induced anxiety-arousal states result in narrowed
 
attention (C.F., Levinson, 1989; Nideffer, 1993). However,
 
Eysenck (1992) points out that "When peripheral information
 
is of as much relevance as central information, then anxiety
 
seems to be associated with a broad sampling of information"
 
(p. 54). In other words, if there is a situational demand
 
for response where the overall environment is considered
 
threat-salient, a larger visual sampling of information will
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be attempted, including that on the periphery of vision.
 
For instance, a person who is presenting a vitally important
 
project to an unfamiliar group may visually appraise salient
 
threat stimuli from a broad attentional field. The person
 
may automatically, repeatedly and in rapid succession, scan
 
the room for cues in an unfocused manner—peripherally
 
noticing facial expressions, furious note-taking> drooping
 
eyelids, anxious posturing. This is in contrast to an
 
equally arousing exam-taking situation where salient threat
 
can focus the same person's attention upon individual
 
written items ohe-at-a-time, eliminating other distractions.
 
Eysenck (1992) suggests that certain aspects of visual
 
attention help to explain why these alternate and
 
contrasting scope-of-attention prpcesses may occur. First,
 
attention and anxiety affect the visual spotlight (visual
 
"beam" of attention) conditionally-—depending on the
 
circumstance, there may be either an enlargement or
 
contraction in breadth. Thus, to some extent, vision can be
 
both broadened to enhance a searching-pattern capable of
 
locating dispersed threat-related cues and narrowly focused
 
on a particular area in the environment that is relevant to
 
responding. Second, a stimulus once detected is then
 
identified—if the stimulus is perceived as a threat,
 
attention is Ipcalized to that point (focused attention).
 
Third, semantic processing is limited to perceptions in the
 
center of the field of attention—individuals only ascribe
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meaning, through association in memory, to information that
 
is the focus of their attention in the visual field.
 
Focused attention is In contrast to a purposeful search of
 
the environment meant to detect possible sources of stimuli
 
(attentional search). The last point distinguishes
 
interaction between the broadening and narrowing of the
 
visual beam and the process of focused attention from that
 
of attentional search (Broadbent, Broadbent, & Jones, 1986).
 
A finite cognitive resources perspective asspumes that a
 
limit to what can be effectively processed would necessarily
 
influence the quantity and quality of information available.
 
It is likely, from the standpoint of anxiety, that the
 
relationship between cognitive function and performance
 
deficits involves the correspondence between a finite
 
capacity for information processing and ah attentional and
 
perceptual interaction that impedes effective responding
 
under stress. This line of research does not consider that
 
observed maladaptive performance in the face of a perceived-

threat results from inattentiveness (ignoring information)
 
or faulty drive processes (fight or flight).
 
Dysfunctional responding reflects interactions between
 
a stress-induced state of anxiety and endogenous aspects of
 
limited cognitive processing capacity, both attentive and
 
pre-attentive. The model of working memory, limited
 
capacity, and coping ability are implicated in a limited
 
cognitive capacity explanation of anxious responding. This
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is in contrast to a view that predicts a direct relationship
 
between arousal and the narrowing of attentional focus, but
 
does not preclude inattentiveness or faulty drive processes.
 
Differences exist between processing limitation
 
perspectives and Easterbrook*s hypothesis. First,
 
experimental evidence suggests there are relevant attributes
 
of working memory that serve to limit information processing
 
(Baddeley, 1990). In a recent review of studies
 
inyestigating GAD, Borkovec (1994) concluded that the
 
executive and the articUlatory loop overwhelmingly dominate
 
cognitive resources, maintaining threat as worry in working
 
memory, at the expense of imaginai processing. This
 
suggests that the allocation of processing resources
 
interactively supports an organizing role of focused
 
attention. The implicit variation of responses to threat in
 
a given situation is more in accord with experimental data
 
concerning individual differences in threat-related stimulus
 
perception and responding. This is in contrast to a direct
 
relationship between arousal and narrowed attentional focus
 
dictated by Easterbrook's hypothesis.
 
Second, a limited resource capacity perspective infers
 
the a:dvent of worry and intrusive thoughts as a component of
 
anxiety in working memory. A negative biasing of ongoing
 
mentation through selective interpretation of ambiguous
 
stimuli as threat-related has been shown to impact cognitive
 
processing (Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996). In this
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regard, MacLeod (1996) states that, " . .. evidence has
 
accumulated to suggest that it is the worry component of
 
elevated anxiety, rather than the arousal component, which
 
is most strongly predictive of impaired cognitive
 
performance" (p. 48).
 
Third, limited cognitive resources allow for
 
situational stress and individual differences in coping
 
ability to be related in diathesis origin; The preceding
 
discussion suggests a correspondence between the degree of
 
worry, the influence of stress-induced anxiety on the
 
perception of threat, and the degree to which that threat-

perception intrudes upon an individual's ability to cope
 
with anxiety. In other words, when responding to a.
 
stressful situation with the potential for perceived harm,
 
biased processing of threat relevant information assumes
 
primacy in working memory rather than instituting an
 
automatic arousal concomitant with narrowed attentional
 
engagement. It follows that the behavioral, cognitive, and
 
physiological channels of anxious responding are observable
 
manifestations of the complex interactions between stress,
 
anxiety, arousal, and attention co-occurring with cognitive
 
processing of perceived threat stimuli. Once again, this is
 
in contrast to the observable factors of anxiety resulting
 
from processing primarily dominated by the effects of
 
arousal on attention.
 
Furthermore, decreasing arousal alone is not
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 necessarily correlated with the successful treatment of
 
anxiety. In Some instances (e.g., test anxiety) mitigating
 
arousal is ineffective (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). An
 
information processing model considers coping with anxiety
 
as moderating aspects of arousal and other factors that may
 
otherwise come to dominate information processing (e.g.,
 
anxiety and attention). Identifying those attributes of
 
cognitive coping that moderate worry as a dominant component
 
of anxiety elicited in response to a perceived evaluative
 
threat may reveal important information conGerning the
 
regulation of anxious responding. If this is the case, the
 
presence or absence of conditions that are related to
 
specific coping attributes may contributo to understanding
 
the presence or absence of vulnerability factors related to
 
anxious dysfunction.
 
Individual Differences in Anxiety Related Processing
 
People's acquired associations between stress in a
 
social context and perceived threat (e.g., fear of an
 
impending evaluation in a social setting) may contribute to
 
an increased sensitivity for anxious responding (Williams et
 
al., 1988). The increased propensity for experiencing
 
stress and anxiety can develop to the point where the demand
 
for cognitive resources prohibits effective appraisal or
 
adequate performance in everyday situations that are
 
innocuous but simila]^ to those in which the original threat-

association was acquired. For example, a novice college
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student may consider class discussion a frightening
 
experience due to past associations where providing an
 
inadequate response in high-school meant an episode of
 
negative Social evaluation. In this case, regardless of the
 
student's preparation or knowledge, actively participating
 
in class may not be forthcoming due to worry elicited by the
 
avSrsive effects of anxiety upon retrieval of the right
 
thing to S^y* Individuals susceptible to a stress-^induced
 
bias for prpcessing ambiguous social situations as
 
evaluative threat may inadvertently increase their
 
likelihood to engage in anxiety-^related processing in
 
particular, at the expense of accurate perception and task-

relevant behavior (Eysenck, 1992).
 
Within the context of perceptions and cognitions of
 
threat-related stimuli, Eysenck (1991b) has proposed a
 
hypervigilance theory (HT). HT assumes that cognitive
 
processes relevant to threat detection are evolutionarily
 
adaptive. Thus, hypervigilance is related to a normal
 
endogenous cognitive function that executes a rapid
 
orientation of automatic perceptual processing supported by
 
the re-allocation of attentional resources from competing
 
neutral stimuli to signals of threat (Gray, 1985). HT
 
places the automatic focusing of attention on threat in the
 
context of a characteristic innate cognitive feature of
 
attention essential to survival. This aspect of attention
 
facilitates appropriate and functional cognitive channels
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for threat's rapid detection.
 
It follows that attentional bias towards threat
 
processing is subject to individual variation. According to
 
HT, a cognitive bias for over-processing threat represents
 
an increased affectability of systems that are otherwise
 
evolutionarily adaptive. Therefore, in an otherwise
 
functional non-clinical population, anxiety disorder may
 
originate with the over-processing of both threat-related
 
and ambiguous situations as those that precede harm. It is
 
on the basis of these assumptions that HT predicts
 
differences of pre-attentive and attentional cognitive
 
functioning between individuals who possess a temperamental
 
predisposition towards higher levels of anxiety and those
 
not so temperamentally predisposed—referred to in HT as
 
high trait-anxious and low trait-anxious individuals
 
respectively. Furthermore, HT posits a relationship between
 
high dispositional trait-anxiety (HDTA) and anxiety
 
disorder. These individuals represent a population
 
characterized by an endogenous proclivity to regularly over-

process task irrelevant ambiguous stimuli as threat-related.
 
The limited amount of cognitive resources that remain when
 
in an increased state of stress is inadequate for normal
 
functioning. Thus, these individuals may have an overall
 
lower threshold of susceptibiility to anxiety, worry, and
 
anxiety disorder.
 
17
 
Research on Hypervigilance
 
Hypervigilance is an individual difference in
 
perception processing that can be directly related to
 
anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). HDTA individuals may manifest
 
hypervigilance in several ways. There may be a noticeable
 
inclination towards automatically processing information
 
that is irrelevaht to the task-at-hand. This amounts to
 
distractibility, characterized by mind-wandering and the
 
inability to sustain focused attention on necessary task-

related functioning. Visual scanning may also present
 
itself with quick eye movements seeking out threat-related
 
stimuli that, once located, may elicit subsequent eye-

fixation. There may be biased or selective attention
 
towards threat-related rather than threat-neutral Stimuli;
 
attention is repeatedly directed towards stimuli in the
 
immediate environment that is possibly, but not necessarily,
 
related to harm. An additional quality that may be present
 
is the broadening of attention prior to detecting and
 
processing the salience of threat related stimuli, followed
 
by a narrowing of attention during threat processing. This
 
corresponds to the narrowing and widening of the visual beam
 
of focused attention that facilitates the detection of
 
threat-related stimuli and subsequent allocation of
 
processing resources directing a threat response.
 
The interactive quality of anxiety in the presence of
 
stressful situations has led researchers to investigate the
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 role of HDTA and state anxiety components in the etiology of
 
anxiety disorder—both are implicated in the development of
 
anxiety related dysfunction. It is important to clearly
 
emphasize that dispositional (trait) and state anxiety are
 
conceptually distinct. Trait anxiety has been characterized
 
as temporally stable and dispositional (endogenous). In
 
contrast, state anxiety is generally regarded as teitiporally
 
transient and situationally defined (exogenous).
 
Eysenck (1992) has suggested that the distinctibn
 
between trait and state resembles what Ryle (1949) has
 
termed "disposition and occurrence. Disposition is an
 
attribute given in consideration of predictable responses
 
that are cohsistently evident across time under identifiable
 
conditions. In contrast, an occurrence is an observed
 
response isolated in time and frequency as a single event.
 
In this sense negative responding to testihg as evaluative
 
questioning is consistent with disposition whereas worry
 
focused upon the grade is preoccupation with a specific
 
result or occurrence.
 
In acpprdance with the separateness of disposition and
 
state, research on HT has focused on CQmparisons of task
 
performance under conditions of cognitive demand. HT
 
research typically employs participants from functional
 
populations rated high and low on dispositional anxiety,
 
clinically disordered populations, and successfully
 
recovered anxious populations. In this regard, Eysenck has
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suggested that experimental data on HT reveals a
 
relationship between Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) and
 
the HDTA individual.
 
GAD is a diagnosable DSM-IV anxiety disorder. It is a
 
defining characteristib of individuals who are diagnosed
 
GAD-positive to manifest " ... an intensity, duration, or
 
frequency of... anxiety and worry [that] is far out of
 
proportion to the actual likelihood or impact of the feared
 
event. The person finds it difficult to keep worrisome
 
thoughts from interfering with attention to tasks at hand
 
and has difficulty stopping the worry" (DSM-IV, 1994; p;
 
443).
 
A central component of GAD is a systematic bias in the
 
interpretation and subsequent processing of irrelevant,
 
ambiguous stimuli as threatening. HT assumes that this bias
 
is a non-normal cognitive function related to the presence
 
of hypervigilance in HDTA individuals.
 
Eysenck (1991) has found support for HT in a series of
 
studies investigating cognitive vulnerability to GAD. His
 
assessment is principally concerned with discriminating
 
between two hypothesized forms of cognitive vulnerability to
 
GAD that may be present in HDTA individuals. One possible
 
form, termed "manifest vulnerability," represents a low-

level of constant and chronic vulnerability to anxiety
 
disorder that exists regardless of state anxiety or stress.
 
The second possible form is termed "latent vulnerability."
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Latent vulnerability represents a threshold for clinically
 
anxious dysfunction that is significantly lowered for HDTA
 
individuals when compared to non-HDTA individuals in certain
 
situations. The dysfunctional condition only emerges in the
 
presence of stress-induced anxiety state anxiety, indicating
 
that latent vulnerability is stressed-state dependent.
 
HT research paradigms measure differences between the
 
anxiety-related cognitive functioning present in groups of
 
HDTA individuals, low dispositionally anxious normal
 
controls, currently diagnosed clinically GAD individuals,
 
and recovered post-morbid GAD individuals. If a state-

anxiety-independent manifest vulnerability factor exists for
 
GAD, cognitive-related task-performance in unstressed HDTA
 
individuals should more closely resemble GAD populations
 
When compared to normal controls or recovered GAD
 
populations. On the other hand, if HDTA individuals more
 
closely resemble normal controls until a stress-induced
 
state of anxiety occurs, at which time their cognitive
 
functioning is relatively comparable to that of GAD
 
populations, then support would be found for a latent
 
vulnerability factor. Consistent with a diathesis-stress
 
model, Eysenck's research suggests that hypervigilant HDTA
 
individuals in methodologically appropriate stressful
 
situations are representative of a latent vulnerability to
 
GAD.
 
Additional research has implicated the presence of
 
21
 
hypervigilance in HDTA individuals, in an important
 
illustration of the distractibility component of HT,
 
Mathews. May, Mogg, and Eysenck (1990), manipulated the
 
awareness of location for a target stimulus presented with
 
either neutral or threat-related destructors. In their
 
study, Mathews et al. utilized groups Of GAD recovered and
 
currently diagnosed individuals in addition to normals. Two
 
experiments analyzed differences between groups on the speed
 
of stimulus detection when neutral letters or words were
 
presented as stimulus targets in the presence of various
 
destractors.
 
In the first experiment, the neutral letter target Was
 
detected on-screen, in the presence of a number termed a
 
destructor digit. These targets were not processed
 
significantly different by any of the three groups when
 
compared to one another. In the second experiment neutral
 
words were used as targets, and threatening or non­
threatening words were presented simultaneously as
 
destructors. When compared to normals, the recovered and
 
currently GAD diagnosed groups showed significantly greater
 
latency (slower detection speed) in locating the target,
 
across cued (a dot indicating the target's forthcoming
 
location) and uncued (no indication) conditions in the
 
presence of destructors. In the absence of destructors
 
there were no significant differences between groups;
 
distraction rather than orienting cues affected the anxious
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groups.
 
A comparative analyses of the three groups concerning
 
distraction effects (using either threatening or non
 
threatening destructors) on uncued trials revealed that when
 
non-threat destructors were presented, the pattern of
 
effects in the normal and recovered groups resembled each
 
other. This suggests that GAD recovered individuals and
 
normals locate and process words in the presence of non-

threat distraction equally well; distraction in and of
 
itself was not a factor. This was in contrast to the threat
 
word destructor condition where recovered GAD individuals
 
resembled the currently diagnosed GAD individuals while
 
neither resembled the normal controls. Although capable of
 
processing in the presence of distraction per-se, the
 
qualitative nature of the distraction affected recovered GAD
 
individuals, with threat words demanding an increase in
 
cognitive processing.
 
Similar support for hypervigilance as a component of
 
dispositional anxiety and its relationship to GAD comes from
 
experimental investigations of selective processing (for a
 
discussion, see Eysenck, 1991a). Mogg, Mathews, and Eysenck
 
(1992) compared GAD, GAD recovered, and normal control
 
groups with each other on the selective allocation of
 
attention towards threat related and neutral words presented
 
in paired sequence. The first word in the presentation
 
sequence was a prime eliciting the activation of semantic
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associations in memory. Immediately following the prime,
 
the paired neutral or threat-related target-word appeared
 
and was vocally identified by the participartt. A reduction
 
in the time taken to identify the target-word was assumed to
 
indicate that a facilitation of attentional responding had
 
occurred due to the semantic association with the antecedent
 
prime-word present in memory.
 
As predicted, the normals showed no difference in the
 
allocation of attention when comparing threat-related to
 
neutral target word-naming response times. However, the GAD
 
diagnosed individuals showed a significant attentional bias
 
towards threat-related target words over neutral words.
 
This was indicated by the relative increase in speed with
 
which the naming of threat-related words took place. These
 
and other experimental findings suggest that hypervigilance
 
is a substantive element contributing to dispositional
 
anxiety (for a discussion, see Eysenck, 1992).
 
Current research investigating HT is focused on
 
determining if predicted elements in high trait anxious
 
individuals are at work in the postulated relationship
 
between biased threat processing and the latent
 
vulnerability to GAD. Eysenck (1992) has concluded that
 
fear of evaluation occurring in a social setting may be
 
implicated as one such element. Importantly, he states, that
 
the biased processing of ambiguous stimuli as threat-related
 
may create " ... unrealistic social-evaluative worries"
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(p.162) that are excessive and uncontrollable. The
 
selection of a social environment where state-anxious and
 
trait anxious individuals are routinely evaluated would
 
complement an investigation of possible relationships
 
between the fear of evaluation, worry, and stress-induced
 
anxious dysfunction representing a latent vulnerability
 
factor to GAD. College students with test anxiety are such
 
a population. The worry and fear of evaluation in test
 
anxiety corresponds to those elements of anxiety and threat
 
that EySenck has suggested affects the relationship between
 
endogenous biased threat processing and latent vulnerability
 
(Flett & Blankstein, 1994).
 
HT, Test Anxiety, and Latent Vulnerability to GAD
 
College students represent an adult population in which
 
testing, as a social evaluative experience, is a common
 
source of stress. Test anxiety may be viewed as a specific
 
category of social-evaluation anxiety occurring in this non­
clinical, and so, generally functional population (for a
 
discussion, see Krohne, 1992). Test anxiety is defined as
 
the maladaptive and anxious response to the stressful
 
evaluative experience of testing concomitant with a
 
persistent preoccupation with possible failure (Sears &
 
Milburn, 1990). Furthermore a central feature in test
 
anxiety in excessive and intrusive rumihative thoughts
 
concerning negative evaluation (Carver & Scheier, 1989).
 
Studies (e.g.. Sears & Milburn, 1990) have shown that
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 test anxious individuals• attentional focus is cdnstrained
 
during test taking by a fear of failure due to their self-

perceived lack of behavioral competency when subjected to
 
evaluation; in test anxiety the test is cognitively over-

processed as a perceived threat stimulus that elicits a fear
 
of negative evaluation and anxious worry concerning poor
 
performance. Fear of negative evaluation is a distressed
 
and anxious preoccupation with others* perceptions of the
 
individual*s failure to adequately perform in accordance
 
with social norms. The test-anxious individual is
 
threatened and worried by sustained, unwanted, and intrusive
 
thoughts related to perceptions that suggest an inadequate
 
test performance may lead to a form of social rejection and
 
social censorship by others.
 
During test-taking, the test anxious student exhibits
 
the three factors generally found in anxious responding.
 
Thus, there may be present the worries, actions, and
 
sensations characteristic of the behavioral, physiological,
 
and cognitive response channels observed in anxious
 
individuals. For example, test anxious individuals may
 
simultaneously act to behaviorally subvert their doing well
 
on the day of the test by showing up late (behavioral;
 
Murray & Warden, 1992), expect to suffer from moments of
 
physiological distress such as heart palpitation, sweating,
 
dizziness (physiological; Reiss, 1991), regard the test as
 
linked to an ever-expanding cycle of failure in general
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(worry; Flett & Blankstein, 1994), and experience an
 
inability to sustain task-related mental focus (cognitive
 
interference; Sarason, 1984).
 
Research suggests that fear of evaluation in test
 
anxiety is consistent with the fear of negative social
 
evaluation (FNSE) component observed in GAD (C.F., Edwards &
 
Trimble, 1992; Endler, Parker, Bagby, & Cox, 1991).
 
Furthermore, in both test anxiety and GAD, worry as the
 
cognitive component of anxiety is most representative of an
 
individual's threat processing and responding. Thus,
 
corresponding differences between the worry these two groups
 
have may reflect differences in aspects of the stress they
 
experience (e.g., school vs. work, class discussion vs.
 
public speaking). It follows that characteristic attributes
 
of worry that differ between test anxiety and GAD may
 
somehow represent separable processing characteristics
 
affecting dysfunction across differing stressful situations.
 
In the academic environment, where the organized and
 
ritualized regimen of higher education culminates in
 
evaluation by a familiar and standardized form of testing,
 
anxious responding may be isolated in narrow areas, such as
 
a fear of tests and worry about grades.
 
However, the scholastic expression of social-evaluative
 
fear may contrast with its expression in a relatively
 
spontaneous everyday social environment. For example,
 
unlike the student facing a test, a trait anxious sales
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person extemporaneously speaking at a out-of-town meeting
 
may be the object of intense evaluative scrutiny. If this
 
stressful evaluative experience leads to anxiety and an
 
inadequate performance, it seems improbable that a
 
corresponding fear of the meeting's topic would become the
 
focus of worried thought. Rather, an increased occurrence
 
of broad and diffuse worry about stressful evaluative
 
responding in-general seems more likely. This is in accord
 
with HT's perspective in that biased processing of ambiguous
 
social stimuli as threat-related may meaningfully contribute
 
to increased unrealistic worry. Thus, an initial stressful
 
social interaction that increases the awareness and fear of
 
possible negative evaluation may initiate or contribute to
 
chronic, broad, excessive, uncontrollable worry of a kind
 
that characterizes GAD.
 
Learning the process of learning how to be successful
 
in evaluative situations is one job of institutionalized
 
education. In this regard, the scholastic environment's
 
function is to inculcate coping strategies as a means of
 
meta-enabling the student. Importantly, the material to be
 
learned is presented in a manner appropriate for an
 
unambiguous and clearly stated evaluative objective achieved
 
through formal testing. The effect of this learning may
 
transform the HDTA student's perception of evaluative threat
 
in-general into a fear of test taking in-particular. HDTA
 
anxious students with high levels of test anxiety may be
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representative of endogenous biased threat processing.
 
However, the disordered expression of this bias threat as
 
GAD, may be moderated by the structured, routinized,
 
educational environment with its relatively effective and
 
concerned population of accessible peers, scholars, and
 
administrators.
 
The explicit rules and the implicit routines of a
 
university-domihated lifestyle impose an organized
 
structuring of behavior. The enforced doctrines of
 
matriculation and the repeated, unavoidable, systematic
 
exposure to a disambiguating learning environment may
 
increase some HDTA student's overall coping proficiency.
 
This seems reasonable as the academic environment is
 
ostensibly formulated to orient the focus of attention
 
toward situationally relevant social stimuli in a non­
threatening and unambiguous way in order to preclude
 
unwanted distraction. In part, academia may inadvertently
 
increase cognitive functioning in some HDTA students by
 
environmentally suspending the proclivity for biased threat-

processing and anxiety-driven global worry. What remains as
 
a residual is the stress-induced test anxiety. For these
 
students, test taking is the academic equivalent to a
 
stressful social situation where hypervigilance biases
 
cognitive processing and inadequate coping with negative
 
evaluation and failure perpetuates a degradation of task-

performance.
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The test anxious student's adaptive responses to the
 
systematic training of academic discipline may direct
 
attention away from non-scholastic evaluative concerns that
 
might otherwise sustain an evolution towards severe global
 
dysfunction (Endler, Kantpr, & Parker, 1994). Spielberger
 
and Vagg (1987) have noted that test-anxiety treatment
 
programs rely upon a predictable traditional Mucational
 
setting to help inculcate effective coping strategies.
 
These programs utilize group discussion, skills training,
 
and focused cognitive processing directing effort towards
 
overcoming evaluative concerns. The intent is to
 
... help students to organize and structure their
 
activities in test situations, thus contributing indirectly
 
to improved test-taking skills" (Spielberger & Vagg, 1987;
 
p. 182).
 
In comparison with a university context, everyday
 
social evaluation may be subject to a lesser degree of
 
environmental moderation. For instance, a job interviewer
 
might challenge an HDTA job candidate with a fear of
 
negative social evaluation to make an impromptu presentation
 
of an imaginary product line. In this and similar
 
instances, environmental structure is problematic, and
 
occurrence of disordered anxious cognitive, behavioral, and
 
physiological responding that perseveres across time may be
 
more likely. If a latent vulnerability factor exists, the
 
lack of structure and learning may contribute to the
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OGCurrence of chronic worrying characteristic of GAD (Carver
 
& Scheier, 1989).
 
Under stressful state-anxious evaluative conditions,
 
the test anxious HDTA student exhibits all three of the
 
factors of anxious responding. However, the most operative
 
dysfunctional factor is the cognitive element of worry.
 
Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the test anxious
 
individuals' fear of evaluation is closely tied to a
 
corresponding social evaluative fear present in GAD
 
diagnosed individuals (Edwards & Trimble, 1992; Endler,
 
Parker, Bagby, & Cox, 1991). HT, PET, and the speculated
 
latent vulnerability to GAD present in certain trait anxious
 
individuals, suggest that the fear of negative evaluation
 
component in test anxiety is related to the FNSE component
 
in GAD and social phobias. Thus, some students with test-

anxiety may represent socially anxious, but coping, trait
 
anxious individuals with a moderated vulnerability to GAD.
 
In consideration of this possibility, related questions
 
emerge. For instance, is a GAD evaluative worry component
 
present in some test anxious HDTA college students but not
 
others? Do some test anxious individuals quantitatively
 
differ in worried-thought occurrence and worry-arena breadth
 
from others? In addition, do they differ in how diffuse
 
their worried ruminative thoughts are-—a qualitative aspect
 
of their worry? Do differences in the quantitative and
 
qualitative aspects of worry correspond with differing
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degrees of general coping ability in test anxious HDTA
 
college students?
 
Social Threatf cognitive Coping^ and GAD
 
The current discussion takes the perspective that
 
stress-induced, state anxiety elicits the biased processing
 
of ambiguous social stimuli as evaluative threat initiating
 
uncontrollable anxious worry in some HDTA individuals. In
 
response to the demands of stress, working memory's
 
executive control attempts to allocate additional cognitive
 
resources. Some HDTA individuals have no excess resources
 
available and cannot shift utilized resources to the
 
executive control, presumably due to the maintenance of on
 
going worry in the articulatory loop of working memory.
 
Thus, an important quality of HDTA individuals is that worry
 
limits the degree to which perceptions of threat can be
 
efficiently regulated. Under stress, increased cognitive
 
effort may cope with additional demands from the executive
 
control, although effort does not increase the efficiency of
 
responding as much as maintain existing performance levels.
 
It is reasonable to assume that if the HDTA
 
individual's cognitive efforts successfully cope with
 
situational response—demands, decreasing stress may occur.
 
However, threat-processing is regulated outside of awareness
 
and not directly moderated by increased cognitive effort.
 
The HDTA individual's negative cognitive bias works against
 
effortful coping and overloads working memory systems. This
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can lead to a global state of anxious arousal producing
 
intrusive and uncontrollable worrisome ruminations (lexical
 
processing) that serve to facilitate gross misperceptions
 
and misrepresentations in consciousness while decreasing the
 
probability of adequate social responding. What responding
 
does occur is a warding-off of threat in the guise of
 
socially unacceptable and inept conduct (defensiveness
 
possibly concomitant with avoidance). The implied
 
circularity of negative interpersonal responding has been a
 
contributing pre-morbid factor in the case histories of GAD
 
(Vitkus, 1996).
 
A specific category of social interactions may be
 
intensely stressful to an HDTA individual (e.g., speaking
 
with authority figures, interacting with the opposite sex).
 
According to the theoretical perspective taken by this
 
study, circumstances that elicit corresponding anxious
 
arousal also increase the probability for automatic
 
interpretation of irrelevant/ambiguous stimuli as threat and
 
subsequent threat responding as one or all of the observable
 
anxiety response channels—-cognitive, behavioral, and
 
physiological factors. It is reasonable to assume that
 
experiencing a spiraling incline in the frequency of and
 
intensity of stressful situations may contribute to higher
 
levels of global stress. Thus, an overall increase in the
 
frequency of anxiety provoking situations may lead to a
 
lengthening in duration of event related stressed-states and
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 heightened perceived presence or salience of event related
 
evaluative threat.
 
Given the above, it seems unlikely that the HDTA
 
individual would respond to fewer and fewer situations with
 
worry. Rather, a generalization of perceptions of
 
evaluative threat and ambiguity would seem to be indicated.
 
Thus, over time the HDTA individual may develop a
 
circularity of anxious dysfunction that generalizes to a
 
broader variety of recurring situations, increasing the
 
probability that uncontrollable worry will be a consistent
 
element present during many different social interactions
 
across many life-domains. Furthermore, there may be an
 
acquired susceptibility to engage in threat processing.
 
This is made more probable given the reasonable assumption
 
that most social interaction requires a tacitly understood
 
and shared context that abridges ambiguity in communication.
 
However, under stressed circumstances, ambiguity may
 
nevertheless prevail.
 
Consider the perceptiohs of an HDTA student attemptihg
 
to add an important class. The shared context between
 
themselves and a professor who might add them may be
 
disparate, due to the student's automatic bias for threat
 
processing. The resulting ambiguity could obscure the
 
perception of inforffiiation relevant to efficient interaction
 
between the student and the class instructor. if a
 
stressful professor/student interaction ensues, the already­
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stressed HDTA student•s anxiety and worry may escalate past
 
the point of effortful coping, with simultaneous maintenance
 
of adequate task performance becoming problematic. Under
 
these circumstances, the student might not be able to re­
focus adequate attention upon relevant disambiguating
 
information; despite either person's intent, the student's
 
task-disoriented processing could become a string of
 
defensive, poorly conceived responses. The student's
 
ability to direct the conversation towards a satisfactory
 
conclusion at that point would be unlikely. The student's
 
failure to successfully petition might contribute to
 
sustaining the now-decreased threshold for global anxious
 
social responding under induced stress.
 
Eysenck (1992) postulates a relationship between coping
 
strategies and vulnerability to clinical anxiety, stating
 
that "inter-individual" social evaluative cognitions
 
comprise the preponderance of worried thought-content in
 
HDTA individuals. The preceding scenario describes a
 
fictional circumstance that is supported by evidence from
 
many different related lines of experimental inquiry cited
 
by Eysenck. Related research includes studies on self-

confirmatory evidence seeking by individuals in social
 
situations (Swann, 1987), HDTA negative self-perceptions
 
(Endler et al., 1996), and HDTA individuals' inappropriate
 
social behavior inducing situational stress (Campbell &
 
Rushton, 1978; Ormel & Wolfarth, 1991).
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Hypotheses
 
Utilizing Eysenck's theoretical framework as meaningful
 
empirically driven constructs with explanatory power
 
concerning the development of worry in GAD, the current
 
study posits specific relationships concerning trait
 
anxiety, test anxiety, and GAD.
 
Research suggests that trait anxiety and test anxiety
 
are characterized by the biased cognitive processing of
 
threat, eliciting worry as the cognitive component of
 
anxious responding (Eyesenck, 1992). Therefore, individuals
 
with high measures of test anxiety should also be trait
 
anxious. These individuals would represent both high trait
 
anxiety and high test anxiety.
 
Studies of clinically diagnosed GAD populations that
 
have Used non—clinical trait anxious populations as a
 
comparison group report a significant correlation between
 
trait anxious worry, as a response to evaluative threat, and
 
worry in GAD. These and other studies report that
 
uncontrollable diffuse worry across many life areas, a key
 
feature existing in pre-morbid and currently morbid GAD
 
populations, pervades the mentation of situationally
 
stressed trait anxious individuals. Both experimental and
 
correlational investigations of GAD utilize the similarly
 
reported characteristics of trait anxious worry as the
 
response compohent most representative of the disorder (for
 
discussion see|Eysenck, 1992). As a result, among high test
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anxious-high tr^it anxious individuals, differing
 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of worry as the
 
cognitive component of anxious threat responding to
 
evaluation should not be distinguishable.
 
Heretofore, studies exploring a relationship between
 
trait anxiety and GAD have assessed differences in
 
maladaptive responding to stressful situations and not
 
comparative differences between the nature of anxious
 
worried thoughtfs. These findings suggest that excessive
 
worry in high trait anxious test anxiety should be self-

rated as diffuse across mahy domains, representing HT and
 
pet's conceptualization of the general endogenous propensity
 
for inaladaptive biased cognitive over-processing of
 
evaluative threat shared by trait anxious individuals and
 
those with GADi Individuals who exhibit comparatively
 
narrow and fewi worry domains concomitant with stress, would
 
be uncharacteristic of GAD's worry component, regardless of
 
their degree olf trait anxiety. This distinction indicates
 
that number of; worries, worry breadth, and worry domains are
 
relevant to dijfferences in threat perception and subsequent
 
processing within a specific anxious population.
 
i
 
Current rjesearch (Flett & Blankstein, 1994) suggests
 
that for trait anxious students, testing should be one of
 
many excessive worry-producing situations—-in this case,
 
worry as a threat-response to the task of successfully
 
completing a scholastic evaluation. Based on this
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assumption worry in test anxiety, as a channel of their
 
anxious responding, should conform to a number of the
 
currently defined attributes of worry observed in high trait
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anxious individuals in general.
 
Furthermor^, within the theoretical framework of
 
Eysenck's HT and PET, these shared attributes of worry are
 
empirically related to the expression of GAD in clinically
 
diagnosed persons (Borkovec & Inz, 1990). As such, trait
 
anxiety, test a|nxiety, and measures of GAD worry should
 
possess a basig relationship and similar cohesive structure
 
of diffuse ruminative thoughts. These thoughts should be
 
measurable as Excessive and uncontrollable worry on reliable
 
self-report assessment instruments. In trait anxious
 
individuals, it is assumed that it is uncharacteristic for
 
worry to be about narrowly focused concerns, but rather
 
characterized by diffuse perseverating and intrusive
 
thoughts acros^ many areas of personal experience.
 
This study suggests that a careful investigation of the
 
relationship between the nature of worry in test anxious
 
individuals and the nature of worry as indicative of
 
possible GAD vulnerability is warranted. In the case of
 
trait anxious students who have test anxiety but do not cope
 
well, latent vulnerability to GAD may be characterized by
 
worrisome, intrusive GAD-like thoughts. The GAD vulnerable
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student's worrying reflects the unmitigated incursion of
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threat-related! evaluation fear structures as worry
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maintained in working memory primed by the perceived threat
 
of ijnpending social evaluation-—including test-taking. It
 
is assumed these students would have worrisome thoughts that
 
are both global in nature and span across many life domains
 
Compared to trait anxious individuals assessed as having
 
test-anxiety concomitant with the ability to cope. Thus,
 
coping test-anxious individuals will self-report principally
 
narrow worry in fewer domains (e.g., academic worry
 
concerning grades) and will not represent a latent
 
vulnerability to GAD^
 
Thus, hypervigilaht trait anxious individuals with a
 
latent vulnerability to GAD should report significantly more
 
diffusion and breadth of worry across many worry domains
 
when compared to those whose higher ratings on measures of
 
GAD worry (e.g., Penn State Worry Questionnaire, PSWQ;
 
Meyer, Miller Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) reflect a GAD-

correlated, high level of global anxious responding.
 
Furthermore, hypervigilant trait anxious individuals should
 
also score higher on domains of worry measures (e.g.,
 
Anxious Thoughts Inventory, AnTI; Wells, 1994a) revealing a
 
significantly broader arena of concerns (unfocused breadth),
 
when contrasted with coping individuals representing
 
significantly fewer and more context-specific concerns as
 
evaluative threat—-such as an upcoming test.
 
An anxiety-moderating influence that may be
 
representative of the coping skills referred to by Eysenck
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(1992) and further developed in the current study, is
 
meaningfully represented by the construct of "Constructive
 
Thinking" (Epstein, 1990) and measured by Epstein's
 
Constructive Thinking Inventory (CTI: Epstein & Meier,
 
1989). In their recent study employing the CTI, Epstein and
 
Katz (1992) point out that "Constructive thinking is defined
 
as the ability to solve problems in everyday life at a
 
minimum cost in stress" (p. 813). The CTI has one global
 
coping factor along with six reliable sub-factors; Emotional
 
Coping, Behavioral Coping, Categorical Thinking, Personal
 
Superstitions Thinking, Esoteric Thinking, and Naive
 
Optimism. The global coping factor and six sub-factors
 
assess a general coping ability, not how individuals deal
 
with stress.
 
The CTI should distinguish between dispositionally
 
trait anxious individuals who have acquired a general
 
ability to cope while in college, but do not do well on
 
tests, and those whose broader dimension of worry persists
 
in the absence of this ability. Importantly, the
 
relationship between the CTI and a latent vulnerability to
 
GAD is hypothesized as a characteristic of cognitively
 
coping with the demands of scholarship and responding to
 
relatively ambiguous stimuli without subsequent anxious
 
arousal.
 
This study's hypothesized theoretical relationship
 
between the structured academic learning environment's
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Gapacity to produce a global coping ability as measured by
 
the CTl and a moderation of trait anxious worry in general,
 
is relevant to its investigation of Eysenck's GAD latent
 
vulnerability factor. This theoretical relationship is the
 
central component of the investigation's general exploratory
 
and descriptive element involving the possible mitigating
 
effects of coping with anxious responding when worry is
 
considered the cognitive element of anxiety. However no
 
mechanism tying individual differences in the scope and
 
nature of trait anxious worry to that moderation is
 
considered. It is likely that the inclusion of this general
 
exploratory and descriptive element will result in valuable
 
collaborative support by providing information resulting
 
from data generated through concurrent CTI measurement.
 
This contribution is well within the purview of the
 
theoretical models employed in this discussion of
 
vulnerability to GAD.
 
By integrating the possible relationship between coping
 
and Eysenck's latent vulnerability to GAD, this study seeks
 
to establish the importance of considering the breadth of
 
worry in test anxious college populations within this
 
context. Specifically, there should be significant
 
differences in social responding. Furthermore, these
 
differences should relate to differences in cognitive
 
coping, measurable with the CTI: high trait anxious test
 
anxious individuals rating high on Constructive Thinking and
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rate low on the DSM-ADIS measures of global worry should
 
rate significantly lower on measures of social phobia and
 
the FNE compared to trait anxious test anxious individuals
 
rating low on Constructive Thinking and rating high on the
 
ADIS-DSMIV measures of global worry. These findings would
 
represent initial support for Eysenck's conclusion that
 
intrasocial elements can be linked to GAD vulnerability
 
through predictions generated by Hypervigilance Theory and
 
Processing Efficiency Theory.
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METHOD
 
Participants
 
The study's participant pool (11= 353) was from a
 
southern California community college student population
 
enrolled in regular classes scheduled during a normal
 
academic-year semester. Participant's characteristics
 
concerning anxiety were unselected.
 
The mean age of those 352 participants reporting age
 
was 23 years. Of those reporting gender (11= 352); 214
 
(61%) were women and 138 (39%) were men, with 1 case
 
missing. For those reporting annual income (n = 335); 219
 
(57.3%) were under $10,000, 40 (11.3%) were between $10,001
 
and $15,000, 18 (5.1%) were between $15,001 and $20,000, 17
 
(4.8%) were between $20,001 and $25,000, 4 (l.l%)were
 
between $25,001 and $30,000, 10 were (2.8%) were between
 
$30,001 and $35,000, 7 (2.0%) were between $35,001 and
 
$45,000, 20 (5.7%) were above $45,000, with 18 (5.1%)
 
missing. Of those reporting race (n = 349); 200 (56.7%)
 
were Caucasian (or White), 78 (22.1%) were Hispanic, 33
 
(9.3%) were African American (or Black), 25 (7.1%) were
 
Asian (or Asian American), 3 (0.8%) were Native American (or
 
American Indian), 10 (2.8%) were Other, with 4 (1.1%)
 
missing.
 
Procedure
 
Survey packets were distributed in class during normal
 
class hours following a brief presentation to familiarize
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the partiGipants with the packet's self-report Likert-type
 
scales and printed instructions. It was assumed that
 
assessment of test-anxiety as well as other anxiety-related
 
constructs by self-report would have enhanced reliability if
 
testing were a salient attribute of the participant's
 
environment. As a result, all surveys were distributed
 
during a class session taking place 3 to 7 days before an
 
examination scheduled for that class. All testing was
 
regularly scheduled on the class syllabus. All participants
 
were given extra credit for the instrument packet•s
 
completion. The amount of extra credit was determined in
 
advance of and was uniform across survey-data collection.
 
Dependent Measures
 
Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994a). The
 
AnTI is a 22 item, five point (1-5) Likert-type scale
 
designed to assess worry in three domains; social worry,
 
health worry, and meta-worry (defined as conscious concern
 
over worry). Wells (1994a) reports the scale as having good
 
internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = .80).
 
Constructive Thinking Inventory Short Form (CTI-S;
 
Epstein & Meier, 1989).
 
The CTI-S is a 52 item, five point (1-5) Likert-type
 
scale designed to assess global coping ability^ Published
 
1994 norms indicate good internal consistency (Cronbach's
 
alpha = .80).
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Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Questionnaire (BFNE;
 
Watson & Friend, 1969).
 
The BFNE is a 12 item, 5 point (1-5) Likert-type scale
 
designed to assess threat-related fear/anxiety responding in
 
evaluative social situations, with scores ranging from 0 to
 
30; higher scores indicating greater perceived social-

evaluative threat. The scale is reported as having good
 
internal consistency (KR-20 = .94) (Corcoran & Fischer,
 
1987).
 
Social Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson &
 
Friend, 1969).
 
The SADS is a 28 item true-false inventory designed to
 
assess the avoiding of social situations due to the anxious
 
and fearful distress experienced in those situations, with
 
scores ranging from 0 to 28; higher scores indicating
 
greater anxious avoidance and social distress. The scale is
 
reported by Corcoran and Fischer (1987) as having excellent
 
internal consistency (Formula KR-20 = .94).
 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory - Form Y (STAI Form Y-1 &
 
STAI Form Y-2); Spielberger, 1983).
 
The STAI Form Y-1 (state) and the STAI Form Y-2 (trait)
 
anxiety inventories are 20 item, four point (1-4), Likert­
type scales. Form Y-1 is designed to assess the situation
 
and time specific elements of anxiety—referred to as state
 
anxiety. Form Y-2 is designed to assess enduring
 
dispositional anxiety-proneness—referred to as trait
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anxiety. Scores for the iScales rahg$ froim 26 to 80 with
 
higher scores indicating greater perceived anxiety.
 
Spielberger (1983) reports excellent reliability for both
 
prorii Y-1 (Crdnbaeh's alpha •925) and {Fbrm y-2 (Crdnbach's
 
alpha = .905).
 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller,
 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990).
 
The PSWQ is a 16 item, five point (1-5) Likert-type
 
scale designed to assess worry as a component of experienced
 
anxiety. Scores range from 16 to 80 with higher scores
 
indicating greater perceived anxious worry. The PSWQ has
 
excellent reliability with Cronbach alphas in the 90s
 
(Paulhus, 1987).
 
Test Attitude Inventory (TAI; Spielberger, Gonzalez,
 
Taylor, Algaze, & Anton, 1978).
 
The TAI is a 20 item, four point (1-4) Likert-type
 
scale designed to assess test-anxiety. Scores range from 20
 
to 80 with higher scores indicating greater test-anxiety.
 
The TAI has reported KR-20 reliability alphas of .92.
 
Social Phobia and GAD Self Report APIS-TV
 
This scale was developed by Mettrick and Lewin as a
 
verbatim reconstruction of the Anxiety Disorders Interview
 
Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, DiNardo, & Barlow),
 
used to diagnose Social Phobia and GAD. The ADIS-IV is a
 
clinical assessment instrument designed to be administered
 
as a structured interview providing detailed information
 
specific to a disorder's DSM-IV description and requisite
 
criterion. The primary function of the ADIS-IV is to
 
augment the therapists' determining the nature and the
 
severity of an individual's presenting dysfunction.
 
The Social Phobia and GAD Self Report ADIS-IV is
 
comprised of two sections; one devoted to the assessment of
 
Social Phobia (SociaT Phobia ADIS-IV) the other is devoted
 
to the assessment of GAD (GAD ADIS-IV).
 
The Social Phobia ADIS-IV section is comprised of 3
 
Subsections termed Social Evaluation, Social Anxiety, and
 
Social Avoidance. Subsectibn items are eight point Likert­
type scale with descriptors labeled "hot at all,"
 
"moderately," and "extremely." The section is designed to
 
assess Social Phobia as anxious responding in social
 
surroundings, higher scores denoting greater perceived
 
anxiety.
 
The Social Evaluation subsection is comprised of 3
 
items that assess general aspects of anxious social
 
perceptions as evaluative concerns (e.g. 'when you're in
 
social situations where others could be evaluating you or
 
when you meet new people, do you feel fearful, anxious, or
 
nervous').
 
The Social Anxiety subsection is comprised of 12 items
 
that assess the severity of anxiety as affect the individual
 
would experience in response to a specific social situation
 
(e.g., being at a party, speaking in public). Below a
 
;,47
 
general measure description asking; "Here are some
 
situations. How anxious would you feel in each situation—
 
and if you found yourself making a decision about doing this
 
thing [sic] when anxious would you do it or avoid it?" is
 
positioned a restatement asking; "How anxious would you feel
 
if you found yourself in a situation where yoti might be:"
 
This restatement precedes the list of 12 situation- specific
 
items (e.g., being at a party, speaking in public).
 
Directly below each of the listed 12 Social Anxiety
 
item, is placed the corresponding Social Avoidance item.
 
Each of the 12 Social Avoidance items is preceded by a
 
question that asks "when anxious would you avoid this?"
 
This question is in reference to the described social
 
situation (e.g., being at a party, speaking in public).
 
The GAD subsection is comprised of 12 items designed to
 
assess worry as the principle cognitive component in GAD.
 
Each item targets one of 12 specific life-domain areas of
 
worry (e.g., being on time, fitness and health). Each life-

domain worry area item incorporates four embedded subscales.
 
In the order in which presented, these embedded subscales
 
are labeled; GAD - Worry Frequency, GAD - Worry Breadth, GAD
 
- Uncontrolled Worry, and GAD - Excessive Worry.
 
The GAD - Worry Frequency subscale is an 8 point
 
numeric index assessing the number of worries the
 
participant experienced per week over the last six months in
 
the specified life-domain worry area. Below a written
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description of the life-domain worry area (e.g., your
 
academic performance, your concern over minor matters/little
 
things)/ is a question asking; "How often you were
 
worried..." Place directly to the right is a sequential
 
numeric index consisting of eight numbers in a horizontal
 
string with anchors 0 and 7, descriptors labeled "never,"
 
"seldom," and "all the time"; the number indicating the
 
corresponding equivalent number of worries.
 
The GAD - Worry Breadth subscale is dichotomous forced-

choice and is designed to assess the diffuse breadth of the
 
individual's worry content in the specified life-domain
 
worry area being assessed. The GAD - Worry Breadth Subscale
 
is placed immediately below the GAD- Worry Frequency
 
measure. To the immediate right of the subscale description
 
asking "Was your worry content" are two boxes located
 
horizontally side by side, with headings placed directly
 
above the boxes labeled focused on the left and wide on the
 
right.
 
Located beneath The GAD - Worry Breadth subscale, are
 
the GAD - Uncontrolled Worry, and GAD - Excessive Worry
 
subscales. The two subscales are designed to assess the
 
degree to which anxious worry in the described worry life
 
domain is experienced as uncontrollable and excessive. To
 
the immediate right of a subscale description question
 
asking "was the nature of your worry" are placed two eight
 
point (0-7) Likert-type scales in vertical column alignment.
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The first scale is preceded by the term Uncontrolled^ the
 
second scale is preceded by the term Excessive. Item
 
descriptors are labeled "not at all," "moderately," and
 
"extremely." Higher scores denote greater perceived anxious
 
worry in the life domain being assessed.
 
Predictions
 
Utilizing community college norms published in the
 
Preliminary Professional Manual for the Test Attitude
 
Inventory (TAI: Spielberger, 1980), self-reported ratings of
 
test anxiety as measured by the Test Attitude Inventory
 
(TAI; Spielberger, Gonzalez, Taylor, Algaze, & Anton, 1978)
 
will be used to segment the participant pool into two
 
groups. The 80^^^ percentile groupings of women and men will
 
be employed. The upper 20% will be considered high test
 
anxious individuals and the lower 80% will be considered low
 
test anxious individuals. All comparisons will utilize only
 
high test anxious individuals.
 
1. High test anxious students will also be high trait
 
anxious as measured by the Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI
 
Form Y-2; Spielberger, 1983).
 
2. High Test /Trait Anxious (HT/TA) individuals can be
 
differentiated into two groups based upon significant
 
differences in their mean ratings on the GAD - Excessive
 
Worry subscale.
 
Those individuals rating themselves as having
 
significantly higher comparative ratings on the
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GAD ^ Excessive Worry subsca1e wi11 be:termed GAD worriers
 
with test anxiety and those having significantly lower
 
comparative ratings will be termed HT/TA worriers.
 
3. Prediction number three addresses qualitative and
 
quantitative differences in the nature of worry experienced
 
by GAD worriers with test anxiety and High Test / Trait
 
Anxious worriers.
 
A means comparisons between GAD worriers with test
 
anxiety and HT/TA worriers will reveal the following:
 
Aj. gad worriers with test anxiety will rate
 
significantly higher than HT/TA worriers on two self-report
 
measures associated with GAD; the PSWQ and the ANTI.
 
Bj. gad worriers with test anxiety will rate
 
significantly higher than HT/TA worriers on number of
 
domains of worry as measured by the Number of Worries
 
Per-Week sub-scales and Uncontrollable Worry sub-scales of
 
the GAD Self Report ADIS-IV.
 
Cj. GAD worriers with test anxiety will rate
 
significantly lower than HT/TA worriers on global cognitive
 
coping as measured by the CTI.
 
4. Prediction four addresses differences between the two
 
groups on measures of Social Phobia.
 
GAD worriers will rate significantly higher than HT/TA
 
worriers on measures of social phobia as measured by the
 
SAD, SFNE, and the social phobia scales of the Social Phobia
 
and GAD Self Report ADIS-IV.
 
RESULTS
 
Unlvarlate Data Screening
 
All analyses utilized SPSS v.8.0. All variables were
 
examined for accuracy of data entry and missing values.
 
Missing values were assessed during composite scale
 
construction and were replaced with the mean value.
 
All assessment scales were analyzed for fit between
 
their distributions and the assumptions of univariate
 
analysis. For all scale items, no values were identified as
 
significant univariate outliers (values < 3.3 SDs, ps <
 
.001). The AnTI, BBDl, CESD, PSWQ, SAD, STAI-Yl, SFNE, and
 
the TAX were skewed in the range of 3.3 to 3.9 standard
 
deviations. These scales were retained untransformed due to
 
the importance of preserving extreme values.
 
Scale Construction
 
A; Scale Construction of the GAD Self Report ADIS-IV
 
Number of Worries & Uncontrollable Worries Subscales
 
Two separate principle factor extractions with oblique
 
rotation were performed on response items that comprised the
 
Number of Worries & Uncontrollable Worries subscales of the
 
Self Report DSM AIDS-IV for the sample of 353 participants.
 
Principle components extraction was used prior to principle
 
factors extraction to estimate number of factors, presence
 
of outliers, absence of multicollinearity, and factorability
 
of the correlation matrices.
 
The principle components extraction procedure of Number
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 of Worries subscale (the number of worries per week
 
experienced in the life domain area) revealed adequate
 
factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-measure of sampling
 
adequacy — .895) and no evidence of collinearity. With
 
an Qt, = .001 cutoff 9 of the 353 participants produced
 
scores that identified them as outliers and were deleted
 
from principle factors extraction.
 
Three factors were extracted with corresponding
 
Eigenvalues of 4.920> 1.013, and .924 (see Table 1). These
 
three factors accounted for 57% of the item response
 
variance. With a cut off of .30 for inclusion of a variable
 
in interpretation of a factor one variable did not load on a
 
factor (number of worries per week concerning
 
peers/friends). Scale reliability analysis for all items in
 
their respective factors revealed that the deletion of item
 
6 (social worries) from Factor 2 increased the reliability
 
for this factor from alpha = .75 to alpha .78. This
 
increase was not considered sufficient to warrant the item's
 
removal. Thus, all retained items in their respective
 
factor scales were utilized. Factor 1 (labeled Lifestyle
 
Worries) consisted of worries concerning academic
 
performance, the participant's health, the participant's
 
appearance, the participant's finances, the participant's
 
family and the participant's being on time. Factor 2
 
(labeled Distracting Worries) consisted of worries
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concerning minor matters/little things, lots of details, and
 
the participant's social performance. Factor 3 (labeled
 
Extra-Social Worries) consisted of worries concerning
 
others' health and worries about the community or world
 
affairs. Alphas for these scales were Factor 1 =? .81,
 
Factor 2 = .78, and Factor 3 = .59.
 
The principle components extraction procedure of
 
Uncontrollable Worries subscale items (the extent to which
 
worries in the life domain areas were uncontrollable)
 
revealed adequate factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-measure
 
of sampling adequacy = .9215) and no evidence of
 
collinearity. With an a = .001 cutoff, 13 of the 353
 
participants produced scores that identified them as
 
outliers and were deleted from principle factors extraction.
 
Table 1. Factor Loading of Three Factors: Number of
 
Worries Per Week Across Life Domain (n = 344)
 
Life Domain Factor Number
 
Academic Performance ,731 -.0582 -.173 
Fitness and Health , 688 .0682 .194 
Physical Appearance 570 -.0728 .104 
Finances ,501 
-.0212 .0241 
Family ,481 .0768 .206 
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Being on Time ,419 -.293 -.0615
 
Minor Matters and -.0521 -.806 .0034
 
Little Things
 
Lots of Detail 0124 -.749 .6722
 
Social Performance 193 -.345 .143
 
Other's Health and -.0366 -.162 .651
 
Fitness
 
Community and World 138 -.0133 .380
 
Affairs
 
Peers and Friends -.249 .271
 
Three factors were extracted with corresponding
 
Eigenvalues of 6.457, .968, and .798 (see Table 2). These
 
three factors accounted for 68.5% of the item response
 
variance. With a cut off of .30 for inclusion bf a variable
 
in interpretation of a factor, all variables loaded on a
 
factor. Scale reliability analysis for all items in their
 
respective factors revealed that no item deletions increased
 
any factor's reliability. Thus, all items were retained and
 
utilized in there respective factor scales. Factor 1
 
(labeled External Worries) consisted of worries concerning
 
lots of details, minor matters/little things, the
 
participant's being on time, worries about the community or
 
world affairs, the participant's peers and friends, others'
 
health, and the participant's social performance. Factor 2
 
(labeled Pragmatic Worries) consisted of worries concerning
 
the participant's finances, the participant's family, and
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the participant's academic performance. Factor 3 (labeled
 
Internal-Self Wprries) cohsiste<i of concerning the
 
participant•s appearance and the participant's health.
 
Alphas for these scales were Factor 1 = .88, Factor 2 = .80,
 
and Factor 3 = .88.
 
Table 2. Factor Loading of Three Factors: Uncontrollable
 
Nature of Worry in Life Domain (n = 340)
 
Tiife Domain Factor Number
 
2^
 
Lots of Details 845 -.0036 -.0493
 
Minor Matters and 818 -.0709 -.103
 
Little Things
 
Being on Time 751 -.0157 .0241
 
Community and World 589 .0260 -.0316
 
Affairs
 
Peers and Friends .498 248 .0968
 
Other's Fitness and .436 0516 -.237
 
Health
 
Socia1 Performance .338 292 >208
 
Finances .0897 803 -.0787
 
Family >126 697 .0559
 
Academic Performance .079 595 -.113
 
Fitness and Health .0187 0848 -.828
 
Physical Appearance .0806 0161 -.817
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B: Scale Construction of GAD Self Report. ADIS-IV
 
Excessive Worry Subscale
 
Principle components extraction was used prior to
 
principle factors extraction to estimate number of factors,
 
presence of outliers, absence of multicollinearity, and
 
factorabilitY of the correlation mati^ices.
 
With an et = ^ 001 cutoff 19 of the 353 participants
 
produced scores that identified them as outliers and were
 
deleted from principle factors extraction.
 
Investigation of the correlation matrix prior to factor
 
analysis revealed uniformly high levels of item
 
correlations. This was confirmed during principle factors
 
analysis. Only one factor was extracted due to
 
multicollinearity and singularity.
 
Subsequent scale reliability analysis of all twelve
 
items comprising measure 4 revealed that no deletion of
 
items improved scale reliability. Thus, all twelve items
 
were retained to create an Excessive Worry Scale. Alpha for
 
this scale was .92.
 
C; Scale Construction of Social Phobia Self Report
 
ADIS-IV Social Anxiety and Social Avoidance Subscales
 
Two separate principle factor extractions with oblique
 
rotation were performed on response items that comprised
 
Social Anxiety and Social Avoidance Subscales of the Social
 
Phobia Self Report ADIS-IV for the sample of 353
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participants. Principle components extraction was used
 
prior to principle factors extraction to estimate number of
 
factors, presence of Outliers, absence of multicoHinearity,
 
and factorability of the correlation matrices.
 
The principle components extraction procedure of Social
 
Anxiety subscale items (perceived ahxioushess when engaging
 
in specific social activities) revealed no evidence of
 
collinearity and adequate factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin­
measure of sampiling adequacy - .905). With an <x = .001
 
cutoff, 10 of the 353 participants produced scores that
 
identified them as outliers and were deleted from principle
 
factors extraction.
 
Three factors were extracted with corresponding
 
Eigenvalues of 6.215, 1.740, and .831 (see Table 3). These
 
three factors accounted for 73% of the item response
 
variance. With a cut off of .30 for inclusion of a variable
 
in interpretation of a factor, all variables loaded on a
 
factor. Scale reliability analysis for all items in their
 
respective factors revealed that no item deletions increased
 
any factor's reliability. Factor 1 (labeled Inter-Personal
 
Social Concerns) consisted of a perceived anxiety concerning
 
attending a party, speaking with unfamiliar people, speaking
 
with people in authority, being assertive (refusing unfair
 
requests), initiating a conversation and maintaining a
 
conversation. Factor 2 (labeled Social Exposure Concerns)
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consisted of a perceived anxiety concerning eating in
 
public, using a public restroom, and writing in public/using
 
ATM. Factor 3 (labeled Extra-Personal Social Concerns)
 
consisted of a perceived anxiety when formally speaking in
 
front of people and performing at meetings/classes. Alphas
 
for these scales were Factor 1 = .92, Factor 2 = .80, and
 
Factor 3 = .86.
 
Table 3. Factor Loading of Three Factors: Social Anxiety
 
When Engaged in a Specific Activity (n - 343)
 
Activity Factor Number
 
Initiating a conversation 

Maintaining a conversation 

Speaking with people in 

authority
 
Dating situation 

Being assertive 

Attending a party 

Speaking with unfamiliar 

people
 
Using an ATM 

Using a public restroom 

Eating in public 

.956
 
.906
 
.713
 
.707
 
.659
 
.632
 
.338
 
.517
 
-.0378
 
-.0310
 
0685
 
0036
 
0157
 
, 0262
 
.0597
 
.105
 
292
 
0256
 
.868
 
.721
 
-.0817
 
.0985
 
.0241
 
-.0974
 
.0968
 
.150
 
-.208
 
.330
 
.0582
 
-.0535
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Speaking formally in front .260 .593 -.0166
 
of a group
 
Performing in a class .0206 .0693 .842
 
situation
 
The principle components extraction procedure of Social
 
Avoidance subscale items (avoidance of specified social
 
activities) revealed no evidence of collinearity and
 
adequate factorability (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-measure of
 
sampling adequacy = .894). With an a = .001 cutoff, 9 of
 
the 353 participants produced scores that identified them as
 
outliers and were deleted from principile factors extraction.
 
Three factors were extracted with corresponding
 
Eigenvalues of 5.983, 1.388, and .960 (See Table 4). These
 
three factors accounted for 69% of the item response
 
variance. With a cut off of .30 for inclusion of a variable
 
in interpretation of a factor, all variables loaded on a
 
factor. Scale reliability analysis for all items in their
 
respective factors revealed that no item deletions increased
 
any factor's reliability. Factor 1 (labeled Inter-Personal
 
Social Avoidance) consisted of a perceived anxiety
 
concerning attending a party, speaking with unfamiliar
 
people, speaking with people in authority, being assertive
 
(refusing unfair requests), initiating a conversation and
 
maintaining a conversation. Factor 2 (labeled Social
 
Exposure Avoidance) consisted of a perceived anxiety
 
concerning eating in public, using a public restroom, and
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writing in public/using ATM. Factor 3 (labeled Extra-

Personal Social Avoidance) consisted of a perceived anxiety
 
when formally speaking in front of people and performing at
 
meetings/classes. Alphas for these scales were Factor 1 =
 
.90, Factor 2 = .70, and Factor 3 = .89.
 
Table 4. Factor Loading of Three Factors: Social Avoidance
 
of a Specific Activity When Feeling Anxious n = 344)
 
Activity Factor Number
 
Maintaining a conversation .951 -.0964 -.0594
 
Initiating a conversation .877 -.0738 .0488
 
Being assertive .717 .0617 -.0564
 
Speaking with people in .593 .154 .108
 
authority
 
Dating .514 .236 .102
 
Attending a party .424 .103 .247
 
Using an ATM -.0301 .770 .0239
 
Eating in public .131 .616 .0334
 
Using a public restroom -.0378 .868 .0582
 
Speaking formally in front -.0296 .580 -.0411
 
of a group
 
Performing in a class .0048 -.0607 .905
 
situation
 
Speaking with unfamiliar .391 121 .404
 
people
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Testing of Hypotheses
 
Analyses and Classification of High Test Anxious/
 
Trait Anxious Individuals
 
To identify participants who were high test anxious
 
students, participants were grouped according to normed
 
scores for the percentile (Women M = 53.00, Men M =
 
47,00) published in the Preliminary Professional Manual for
 
the Test Attitude Inventory (TAX: Spielberger, 1980).
 
Participant BO*^*^ percentile norms for this sample were Women
 
M = 59.00, Men M= 50.00.
 
Separate One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs)
 
indicated that the Upper 20'^'^ percentile and Lower 80*^^
 
Percentile Test Anxious groups differed significantly on a
 
comparison of scores on the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
 
Inventory (See Table 5). Those individuals in the Upper
 
20*''' percentile rated significantly higher on both State and
 
Trait Anxiety as measured by the STAI Forms Y-1 (State) and
 
Y-2 (Trait) when compared to individuals in the Lower 80*^*^
 
percentile.
 
Participant mean scores on the STAI Y-2 for Women(M =
 
49.17) and for Men (M = 45.83) corresponded to the 83^'^ and
 
80^^ percentile respectively for college students' scores on
 
the STAI Y-2 published in the Manual for the State-Trait
 
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983).
 
As a result, those participants rating in the upper
 
20*''' percentile of the TAX (n = 96) were selected as
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representative of a study population with high test and high
 
trait anxiety and are referred to as High Test / Trait
 
Anxious (HT/TA). Only HT/TA participants' scores oh
 
assessment instruments of interest were utilized in
 
subsequent analyses.
 
Table 5. Differences in Mean Ratings of the Test Attitude
 
Inventory (TAX) tipper 20*^^ Percentile Group
 
(n = 96) Compared to the Lower Percentile Group
 
(n = 257): STAI Forms Y-1 (State) and Y-2 (Trait).
 
TAX Group
 
Lower 8Q"'% Upper 20*'''%
 
Measure df(If 351^ F Sig M SO M SD
 
STAX Y-1 (State) 32.91 .001 33.40 11.86 41.68 12.61
 
STAX Y-2 (Trait) 58.22 .001 38.42 10.42 48.02 10.76
 
Classification of GAD and HT/TA Worriers
 
As an exploratory procedure, Hierarchical Cluster
 
Analysis with Wards method of classification was employed to
 
investigate the grouping of scores on the Excessive Worry
 
Subscale developed from the GAD section of the DSM ADXS-XV
 
Self-Report. An inspection of the dendogram produced by
 
this procedure revealed that 2 groups could be distinguished
 
based upon participants' self report of excessive worry.
 
Following the exploratory Hierarchical Cluster
 
analysis, a K-Means Cluster was utilized to create a final
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classification of participants into 2 groups based upon
 
their total expressive worry scores. Missing data for 2 of
 
the 96 cases were replaced with mean scores. Convergence of
 
participant ratings on the Excessive Worry Scale used to
 
establish Cluster Centers was achieved in 2 iterations with
 
the Distance between Final Cluster Centers = 28.38 (Cluster
 
1 Center = 20.22; Cluster 2 Center = 48.59). A One-way
 
Analysis of Variance of the group means suggested that
 
Cluster Centers did differ significantly, F (1,94) = 194.74,
 
p < .001. Cluster 1 was labeled individuals with High Test/
 
Trait Anxiety (HT/TA) worry (n =46). Cluster 2 was labeled
 
with GAD Worry (n = 50).
 
A direct Discriminant Function Analysis was performed
 
using the entire 12 excessive worry items of the DSM ADIS-IV
 
GAD section as predictors for the High and Low GAD Worry
 
groups. The discriminant function grouped 49 (98%)of the 50
 
individuals into the category previously determined by K-

Means Cluster Analysis as HT/TA Worry and all 46 cases
 
(100%) into the previously determined category GAD Worry
 
based upon their scores of the 12 excessive worry items.
 
Overall, the discriminant function classified 95 of the 96
 
cases (99%) into the groUps previously established by the K-

Means Cluster Procedure.
 
Differences in DSM - IV Worry Domains, Qualitative
 
Worry, and CTI Global Coping
 
To assess differences between the GAD and HT/TA worrier
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groups in quantitative and qualitative aspects of worry One
 
way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) were performed (see Table
 
6)•
 
To investigate differences in the number and breadth of
 
GAD worry-domain, comparisons were made between GAD and
 
HT/TA worriers on the ANTI, and Routine, Distracting and
 
Extra-Social Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report Number
 
of Worries Subscale.
 
To investigate differences in the qualitative aspects
 
of GAD worry, comparisons were made between GAD and HT/TA
 
worriers on PSWQ and the Extra-Self, Privacy, and Intra-Self
 
Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report Uncontrollable Nature
 
of Worry Subscale.
 
To investigate differences in global coping with
 
stress, comparisons were made between GAD and HT/TA worriers
 
on the CTI Global Coping.
 
Table 6 indicates that all differences on assessment
 
measures of GAD breadth of worry domains and GAD worry were
 
significantly higher for those in the GAD Worry group
 
compared to those in the HT/TA Worry group.
 
However, on the CTI measure of global cognitive coping,
 
those in the GAD Worry group rated significantly lower than
 
the HT/TA Worry Group.
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Table 6. Differences Between GAD Worriers and High Test/
 
Trait Anxious Worriers on Mean Ratings of the GAD DSM ADIS ­
IV SieIf Report Life Domain Number of Wprries and '
 
Uncontrollable Worry Subscale Factors, AnTI, PSWQ, and the
 
CTI Global Coping Scale, (df, 1,94)
 
' Worry Group '
 
Numbers of Worry HT/TA GAD
 
Subscale Factor F Sia M Gd M SD
 
Routine 32.18 .001 .231 4.07 1.15 5.28 .89
 
48.32 .001 .329 2.82 1.45 4.72 1.18
 
Extra-Social 12.80 .001 .108 2.83 1.23 3.79 1.36
 
Uncontrollable Worry
 
Subscale Factor F h M SD M sn
 
Extra-Self 87.99 .001 .499 1.61 1.06 3.71 1.12
 
Pragmatic 51.22 .001 .352 2.53 1.50 4.59 1.27
 
Intra-Self 56.85 .001 .352 1.97 1.53 4.35 1.53
 
AnTI 26.30 .001 .218 64.15 16.29 48.98 12.18
 
PSWQ 25.37 .001 .214 58.41 10.14 47.31 11.18
 
CTI-GLOBAL 23.16 .001 .191 55.52 9.28 46.46 8.97
 
Differences in DSM - IV Social Phobia and Fear of
 
Negative Social Evaluation
 
To assess differences in anxious social responding
 
between the GAD and HT/TA worrier groups. One-way Analyses
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of Variance (ANOVAs) were performed (see Table 7).
 
Table 7. Differences in Mean Ratings Between GAD Worriers
 
and High Test / Trait Anxious Worriers; Social Phobia DSM
 
ADIS - IV Self Report Social Evaluative Items, Social
 
Anxiety, and Avoidance Concerns Subscales; BFNE, and SADS.
 
(df 1,94)
 
Worry Group
 
Social Evaluation HT/TA GAD
 
Evaluation Item F Sia n2 M SD M SD
 
Social 6.70 .011 .070 4.35 2.17 5.49 2.03
 
Evaluation
 
Social 5.76 .018 .060 4.55 2.11 5.53 1.78
 
Interaction
 
Trait Social 5.04 .027 .055 5.50 2.03 6.36 1.54
 
Evaluation
 
Social Anxiety
 
Subscale Factor F Siq M SD M SD
 
Inter-Personal 21.14 .001 .170 3.03 1.58 4.50 1.53
 
Privacy 7.32 .007 .073 1.53 1.83 2.62 1.98
 
Extra-Personal 31.59 .001 .262 2.50 1.53 4.18 1.37
 
Social Avoidance
 
Subscale Factor F Sia M SD M SD
 
Inter-Personal 13.91 .001 .125 2.23 1.70 3.47 1.51
 
Privacy 9.60 .003 .091 1.13 1.57 2.22 .82
 
Extra-Personal 8.22 .005 .085 2.68 2.28 3.95 1.99
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BFNE 14.42 .001 .130 33.78 7.65 40.20 8.22
 
SAD 10.21 .002 .105 9.02 7.23 14.49 8.81
 
To reveal underlying differences in Social Phobia's
 
Anxiety component, comparisons were made between Gad and
 
HT/TA worriers on ratings of the Inter-Personal, Privacy,
 
and Extra-Personal Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report
 
Social Anxiety Subscale.
 
To investigate differences in Social Phobia Avoidance,
 
comparisons were made between Gad and HT/TA worriers on
 
ratings of the Inter-Personal, Privacy, and Extra-Personal
 
Factors of the GAD ADIS-IV Self Report Social Avoidance
 
Subscale, and the Fear of Negative Social Evaluation Brief
 
Form.
 
As illustrated by Table 7, all differences on the
 
Social Phobia Anxiety Factors and Social Phobia Avoidance
 
Factors were significantly higher for GAD worriers in
 
comparison to HT/TA worriers.
 
Ratings on the Brief Fear of Negative Social Evaluation
 
revealed that GAD worriers rated significantly higher on
 
Fear of Negative Social Evaluations compared to HT/TA
 
worriers.
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DISCUSSION
 
This study's findings are in accord with the
 
theoretical position that worry as the cognitive component
 
of anxiety may represent an endogenous negative processing
 
bias for evaluation as threat. It was assumed that a
 
stressful environment would contribute to increased levels
 
of worry and so, facilitate self-report of that worryi On
 
the basis of this assumption, a population of community
 
college students facing a regularly scheduled exam was
 
utilized. These students were given the Test Attitude
 
Inventory (TAI) to assess their current levels of test
 
anxiety. Normed 80^^ percentile scores of a similar
 
population from the published manual of TAI were employed to
 
segment this study's participants into low test anxious and
 
high test anxious groups. A means test comparing the high
 
and low test anxious groups revealed that high test anxious
 
participants were rating significantly higher on the State-

Trait Anxiety Inventory Forms Y-1 and Y-2 (measuring state
 
and trait anxiety respectively). Thus, in a comparison
 
between the two groups, the high test anxious group reported
 
experiencing significantly greater levels of state-dependent
 
anxiety as well as greater levels of overall anxiety. These
 
reported higher levels among high test anxious participants
 
suggests that predictions concerning differences in the
 
quality and quantity of these individuals' worries should be
 
useful in identifying the degree to which that worry is
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similar or dissimilar to anxiety disorder.
 
In functioning trait-anxious populations, Worry
 
elements correlated with anxiety disorder do not necessarily
 
deprive individuals of the ability to perform their day-to­
day routines. Research investigating PET suggests that
 
trait anxious individuals dedicate additional processing
 
resources to the maintenance of, rather than the increased
 
efficiency, of performance tasks. Some high test / trait
 
anxious individuals facing a threatening evaluation task
 
could represent increased risk of dysfunction due to their
 
anxiety. This vulnerability should appear as a similarity
 
between their worry numbers and content and the worry
 
numbers and content reported by individuals diagnosed with
 
GAD.
 
Worry as the cognitive component of anxiety is the
 
central element at work in test anxiety rather than the
 
physiological or behavioral (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). The
 
narrow and specific nature of the worry incapacitates the
 
individual's ability to perform at adequate levels on a
 
specific cognitive task—participating in a standardized
 
evaluation of what they have learned. As in test anxiety,
 
the cognitive component of anxiety in GAD outweighs the
 
physical or behavioral components—GAD is a cognitive
 
processing disorder. Unlike test anxiety, in GAD diagnoses
 
undifferentiated excessive worry is a defining
 
characteristic of individuals who are GAD-positive.
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Thus, HT/TA individuals may be differentiated as GAD or
 
only High Test / Trait Anxious by self-reported levels of
 
excessive worry (as the cognitive component of their
 
anxiety). This prediction stems from two sources. First,
 
Eysenck's (1992) theoretical perspective that stressed high
 
trait anxious individuals possess a negatively biased
 
endogenous threat processing of stimuli, representative of a
 
manifest vulnerability to GAD. Second, research findings
 
indicate that worry, as the cognitive element in anxiety, is
 
a shared central component at work in both test anxiety and
 
GAD. This shared component of worry may differ on
 
measurable gualitative and quantitative dimensions
 
(Spielberger & Vagg, 1995).
 
Within the Diathesis Stress model of anxiety, excessive
 
worry in high trait anxious individuals is a central element
 
related to Social Phobia, GAD, and vulnerability to both GAD
 
and Social Phobia. Research on the nature of anxiety has
 
shown excessive worry to be significantly related to high
 
levels of endogenous biased threat processing in high trait
 
anxious individuals (Crake, Rapee, Jackel, & Barlow, 1989;
 
Schwarzer, 1996).
 
Excessive worry is a DSM-IV criterion for establishing
 
clinical levels of GAD present among high trait anxious
 
individuals. This criterion was measured in the current
 
study by the GAD DSM ADIS-IV Self-report Excessive Worry
 
Subscale. Participant ratings oh this subscale provided a
 
71
 
basis for the classification of two groups~GAD worriers and
 
HT/TA worriers.
 
The anticipated utility of measuring a DSM-IV GAD
 
diagnostic criterion for classification purposes is to place
 
high test anxious trait anxious individuals on a continuum.
 
At one end would be the HT/TA individual whose endogenous
 
negative processing-bias of evaluation as threat did not
 
represent a manifest vulnerability to GAD. At the other end
 
would be those whose processing was more closely aligned
 
with a component residing with clinical GAD populations.
 
This measure preserved a fundamental element of GAD shared,
 
in varying degrees, that could form a bridge between those
 
who are only high test / trait anxious and those who may be
 
vulnerable to GAD. Preserving the link between GAD and test
 
anxiety among the groups maintained a direct relationship
 
between the exploration of significant differences between
 
qualitative and quantitative worry dimensions and the
 
theoretical context of HT and PET.
 
Interestingly, the Excessive Worry Scale emerged as a
 
homogeneous scale due to high inter-item correlations. The
 
high correlations prevented a Factor Analysis of 12 items
 
that eventually were used to comprise the scale. It must be
 
noted that the development of the Excessive Worry Scale in
 
this final homogeneous configuration was unanticipated and
 
serendipitous. Whether the scale is empirically and
 
psychometrically valid in its measurement of excessive worry
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per-se is not addressed here. It is the position of this
 
researcher that the Excessive Worry Scale was legitimately
 
employed due to this study's a-priori integration of the DSM
 
ADIS-IV as a measure of GAD worry.
 
Differentiating HT/TA individuals by their ratings on
 
the Excessive Worry Subscale was a necessary first-step in
 
order to determine important qualitative and quantitative
 
dimensions-of-worry differences in the subsequent groups.
 
The scales inclusion in subsequent analyses reflects the
 
assertion that excessive worry is a central diagnostic
 
element capable of differentiating GAD-like from non GAD-

like groups of participants on the basis of their worry.
 
Furthermore the scale's homogeneity and high reliability
 
suggests that ratings correspond to the participant's
 
experience of excessive worry in general. Subscale items
 
asked respondents to indicate their level of excessive worry
 
in the 12 life domains listed in the GAD DSM ADIS-IV. Thus,
 
high ratings on those items reliably indicate the degree to
 
which excessive worry dominates GAD responding in various
 
performance arenas.
 
A Cluster Analysis was used to classify participants by
 
empirically establishing the similarity in groupings of
 
scores on the GAD Excessive Worry scale. These groupings
 
were then validated through Discriminant Function Analysis
 
correctly classifying 99% of the individuals into their
 
previously established groups. The two groupings were
 
termed GAD worriers and HT/TA worriers.
 
It was jiredicted that GAD worriers would rate higher on
 
reliable measures of GAD and GAD worry when compared to
 
HT/TA worriers. In support of the predictions, those with
 
GAD worry scored significantly higher when compared to HT/TA
 
worriers on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire, the Anxious
 
Thoughts Inventory, all three factors of the Life Domain
 
Number of Worries subscale and all three factors of the Life
 
Domain Uncontrollable Worry subscale. These findings
 
support the hypothesis that a possible relationship exists
 
between some trait anxious individuals and a manifest
 
vulnerability to GAD due to stressed responding increasing
 
negatively biased threat processing.
 
To illustrate, consider the PSWQ; a measure used to
 
discriminate the degree of worried thought in diagnosed GAD
 
populations (Borkovec, T. D., 1994; Wells, A., 1994a). In
 
addition, the Penn State Worry Group has employed the PSWQ
 
to screen unselected populations for incidence of GAD
 
(Borkovec, T.D., Shadick, R., & Hopkins, M., 1991). The GAD
 
worry group's comparatively higher ratings on this measure
 
provide evidence that their worry content (qualitative
 
content) more closely resembles that of GAD diagnosed 
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individuals and more closely resembles the worry of
 
individuals with undiagnosed GAD in unselected populations
 
relative to those individuals who are High Test / Trait
 
Anxious.
 
Furthermore, those classified as GAD worriers rated
 
significantly higher compared to those individuals
 
classified as HT/TA on levels of uncontrollable worry~a
 
qualitative GAD-worry dimension. On average. The GAD worry
 
individual reported comparatively greater difficulty
 
controlling worries on established DSM-IV GAD measures. The
 
GAD worry group reported sighificantly greater difficulty
 
controlling worries that were external in nature, concerned
 
with practical matters, and worries concerning internal
 
self-related issues (e.g., worries concerning lots of
 
details, the community or world affairs, finances and
 
academic performance, and personal appearance). This
 
additional evidence supports the conclusion that qualitative
 
aspects of a stressed, high trait anxious individual•s worry
 
may represent a relative increase in vulnerability to GAD.
 
The GAD worry group also reported quantitative
 
differences in worry compared to the HT/TA group. On
 
average, individuals in the GAD worry group reported
 
comparatively higher levels of worry in domains measured by
 
the AnTI. The GAD worry individuals also reported
 
significantly more worries per week in life areas related to
 
their lifestyle, day-to-day routine, and the larger social
 
world. These findings suggest that compared to high trait
 
anxious individuals with focused concerns over testing, GAD
 
worriers have a considerably greater number and a wider
 
range of anxious ruminative thoughts.
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Lastly, the relationship between cognitive coping and
 
manifest vulnerability to GAD in stressed high trait anxipus
 
individuals was investigated. The exploratory investigation
 
of cognitive coping as a mitigating factor for the manifest
 
vulnerability to GAD centered on the prediction that GAD
 
worriers would score significantly lower on Epstein•s
 
Constructive Thinking Inventory when compared to those
 
individuals classified as having test anxiety concomitant
 
with high trait anxiety. This prediction originates with
 
research that concludes that Constructive Thinking is a
 
measurable component of global cognitive coping with stress
 
(Epstein, S. & Katz, L., 1992; Epstein, S., & Meier, P.,
 
1989). Individuals may experience stress but some will
 
utilize cognitive processes to mitigate a negative impact of
 
stress on performance tasks by implementing increased
 
problem solving without increased stress. It is the
 
perspective of this study that Constructive Thinking may
 
also signify the individual's ability to moderate the impact
 
of stress on thought and so moderate the impact of stress on
 
worry.
 
Thus, it was predicted that individuals who rated high
 
on instruments that measured the GAD quantitative and
 
qualitative aspects of worry would rate comparatively low on
 
Epstein's Constructive Thinking Inventory (CTI) as a measure
 
of global cognitive coping. In support of this prediction,
 
cognitive coping in GAD worriers as measured by mean scores
 
on the Global Coping CTI was significantly lower when
 
compared with HT/TA individuals. This finding is
 
interpreted as suggesting the possibility exists that
 
increased cognitive coping as measured by the CTI is a
 
successful compensatory learned response to stress within
 
the framework of PET. GAD worriers may not learn how to use
 
additional processing to mitigate stress and so reduce their
 
GAD worry because they are worried about testing and
 
everything else. By comparison, increased problem solving
 
processing in HT/TA individuals may be targeted on more
 
narrow concerns relatively focused on testing. This
 
comparative narrowing of focus may increase the cognitive
 
"pay-off" when additional attentional resources are
 
dedicated to learning how to learn a strategy allowing HT/TA
 
students to cope with evaluation.
 
Eysenck (1992) has suggested that manifest
 
vulnerability to GAD in high dispositionally trait anxious
 
individuals may be related to dysfunctional threat
 
responding during social interaction. Threat in these
 
situations is the misinterpretation of ambiguous social
 
stimuli as social evaluative threat concomitant with
 
increased anxiety (in thj-s case measured by GAD worry) and
 
decreased performance levels. The misinterpretation of
 
social interaction as evaluative threat is facilitated and
 
maintained by the high trait anxious individuals' negative
 
cognitive threat-processing bias.
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In order to ascertain whether fear of negative social
 
evaluation and social phobia-like responding are implicated
 
in manifest vulnerability to GAD, comparative differences
 
between HT/TA worriers and GAD worriers on measures of
 
social phobia and fear of negative social evaluation were
 
investigated. It was hypothesized that those with a GAD
 
worry component would score significantly higher on these
 
measures when compared to HT/TA individuals.
 
The findings supported the hypotheses. GAD worriers
 
scored significantly higher on the BFNE, the SAD, the Social
 
Evaluation Items of the Social Phobia ADIS-IV, and the
 
Social Anxiety and Social Avoidance subscales of the Social
 
Phobia ADIS-IV.
 
Those individuals who were broad and diffuse in their
 
excessive worry, who did not problem solve without
 
increasing their stress, also were significantly impacted by
 
evaluative social concerns as well as evaluative testing
 
concerns compared with those individuals whose excessive
 
worry was significantly more constrained and focused on
 
testing. GAD worriers responded significantly higher on
 
comparative ratings of questions that asked them whether
 
they felt ill-at-ease in social situations, were concerned
 
with other's forming unfavorable impressions, were affected
 
by someone's judging them, and the extent to which they were
 
fearful in " ... social situations where others could be
 
evaluating you ..."
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When rating their anxious feelings in situations that
 
required their active involvement, GAD like worriers
 
responded significantly higher compared to HT/TA
 
individuals. On average, the GAD worriers rated higher than
 
HT/TA worriers on Inter-Personal Social Concerns (attending
 
a party, speaking with unfamiliar people, speaking with
 
people in authority, being assertive (refusing unfair
 
requests), initiating a conversation and maintaining a
 
conversation), Social Exposure Concerns (eating in public,
 
using a public restroom, and writing in public/using ATM),
 
and Extra-Personal Social Concerns (formally speaking in
 
front of people and performing at meetings/classes). GAD
 
like worriers responded significantly higher compared to
 
HT/TA individuals when rating their affiliated behavioral
 
avoidance in these situation due to their anxious feelings.
 
Taken together these data suggest that characteristics
 
present in high dispositionally trait anxious individuals
 
are also present in high test anxious community college
 
students. When excessive worry is used to differentiate
 
between groups of high test anxious / trait anxious
 
students, a corresponding element related to GAD worry as
 
threat processing and lowered global ability to cope with
 
stress emerges. This assertion is made more plausible given
 
the size of the corresponding values of eta squared of the
 
means tests of differences between groups on those measures
 
utilized in determining these differences. There is also
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evidence that the fear of negative social evaluation is
 
releivant to the investigation of manifest vulnerability to
 
GAD.
 
Individuals with GAD worry showed a comparative greater
 
number of concerns in the arena of Social Phobia and social
 
evaluation fear. A primary component of test anxiety is
 
fear of negative evaluation. Test anxious students see
 
testing as an evaluative process whose outcome may mean
 
negative social performance judgments. However, compared to
 
the GAD worry group, HT/TA individuals did not augment their
 
concern over testing with increased worry about social
 
avoidance or social-phobic anxious thoughts. It may be that
 
these individuals' focus on learning provides a central
 
theme with which to maintain stability over performance.
 
Thus a poor test is only as threatening as the grade it
 
represents, rather than representing one more areas of poor
 
performance in the student's social life.
 
This study began by postulating that for some high
 
trait anxious individuals the structure provided by the
 
academic environment may serve as a prophylactic for the
 
manifest vulnerability to GAD. A self report measure of
 
excessive worry was employed to investigate qualitative and
 
quantitative dimensions of anxious ruminative thoughts.
 
Findings concerning these differences were in accord with
 
the study's predictions stemming from Eysenck's
 
Hypervigilance and Processing Efficiency Theory. The
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results are interpreted to suggest that the scope of worry
 
in high test f trait anxious individuals may correspond to a
 
comparative degree of dysfunction in cognitive and social
 
A final and exploratory effort of this investigation
 
was to hypothesize that comparative ratings on Constructive
 
Thinking (Epstein & Meier, 1989) would be higher in those
 
individuals whose worry was more focused and less broad—
 
whose worry was constrained in areas directly related to
 
GAD, Fear of Negative Social Evaluation, and Social Phobia.
 
The findings supported the hypothesis. This support led to
 
a preliminary interpretation that the global ability to
 
solve problems without increasing stress may be related to
 
increased competency during stressful social interaction and
 
lower vulnerability to GAD.
 
Importantly, Eysenck (1992) has observed that worry
 
concerning social performance dominates anxious thoughts in
 
clinical GAD populations. He suggests that worry concerning
 
social performance may be an unexplored element in a stress-

diathesis model of manifest vulnerability to GAD. Eysenck
 
states that GAD may result from an endogenous negative
 
processing bias of ambiguous social information as threat.
 
HT/TA individuals who are capable of solving problems
 
without increasing stress would exhibit adequate responding
 
without requiring additional resources dedicated to worry.
 
In contrast, GAD worriers ratings on social phobia and
 
social avoidance factors and social evaluative concerns are
 
significantly higher. Several conclusions can be derived
 
from this interpretation.
 
First, the higher rating of Constructive Thinking among
 
HT/TA individuals may be indicative of lower levels of
 
manifest vulnerability to GAD. Second, the relatively
 
focused worry across fewer GAD related life-domains may
 
indicate higher levels of social and cognitive performance
 
in community college students. Third, this study provides
 
preliminary and gualified evidence for suggesting that for
 
some high trait anxious individuals, the academic
 
environment may be related to the moderation of a manifest
 
vulnerability to GAD.
 
This interpretation is necessarily limited; no data
 
regarding participant cognitive or social functioning were
 
collected and analyzed (e.g., GPA, attendance, comprehension
 
ability). As a result, a relationship between levels of GAD
 
worry and established academic criterion for adequate
 
cognitive or social responding can not be directly assessed.
 
However, Gad-like worry has been shown to be highly
 
correlated and causally implicated in increased distraction,
 
forgetfulness, irritability, and emotional discomfort (for
 
discussion see Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).
 
Thus the assumption that a relationship between observed
 
differences in test anxious students' qualitative and
 
quantitative GAD worry elements and adequate cognitive and
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social performance is justified though not directly
 
supported by empirical evidence gathered in this study.
 
Further research is needed to explore a possible
 
correspondence between levels of cognitive and social
 
functioning in stressed HT/TA individuals, worry, learning,
 
and performance.
 
A relationship may exist between the structured
 
academic environment and the mitigation of worry, and
 
between adequate scholastic functioning and coping with
 
stress as measured by the CTI. Interpretation of the
 
findings concerning relationships of this nature are
 
necessarily qualified by a lack of direct evidence. No
 
attempt to directly assess the impact of the academic
 
environment upon coping with stress and subsequent
 
moderation of GAD worry was made. However, this study's
 
results remain relevant to this issue.
 
The results of this study support an observation that
 
relationships between the structure inherent in academia and
 
a moderating factor in the manifest vulnerability to GAD are
 
possible to explore. It can be concluded that self-report
 
instruments measuring changes in scholastic aptitude along
 
with academic social and cognitive involvement may correlate
 
with changes in qualitative and quantitative aspects of
 
worry. The development of these instruments Would further
 
research in the area of test anxiety and worry. Differences
 
between the HT/TA and GAD worried student groups on the CTI
 
83
 
do suggest that, on average, problem solving without
 
increasihg stress is a factor related to wotry in these
 
populations. Thus, factprs increasing Constructive Thinking
 
as cognitive problem solving are implicated in the
 
mitigation of GAD worry. From this standp6int it is
 
reasonable to argue that the scholastic environment may
 
provide an unambiguous structure for learning problem
 
solving without increased levels of stress, relative to the
 
larger social world. This suggests that future research is
 
required concerning the scholastic environment and that
 
environment's contribution to increased coping and possible
 
decreased manifest vulnerability to GAD worry.
 
In conclusion, this study was successful in its attempt
 
to reveal underlying dimensions of worry and the
 
relationship between those dimensions and cognitive coping
 
with stress. Future research may find it useful to develop
 
models that investigate Epstein's Constructive Thinking as a
 
moderator of GAD worry. Furthermore, the findings suggest
 
that theory and research focused on GAD and Social Phobia
 
are related to research exploring test anxious / trait
 
anxious community college students ability to adequately
 
cope with stress. Lastly, there are elements related to
 
social evaluation and the inference of threat concerning
 
evaluation common to GAD, Social Phobia, and Test Anxiety.
 
This provides preliminary evidence for Eysenck's (1992)
 
statement that social interaction may represent increased
 
worry and stress, resulting in the increased likelihood of
 
vulnerability to GAD. The support gathered for these
 
hypotheses is qualified and provisional. However, it
 
appears that this study does provide initial direction for
 
further exploration of factors that may have a potential to
 
mitigate both test anxiety and GAD.
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